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The Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), the German civil code of 1896,
is still in force in both East and West Germany. Despite important
modifications on both sides and despite special East German legislation
on exchange relationships within the state-owned economy, the civil
law' of contracts, torts, property, and inheritance is still governed by
largely the same provisions and concepts. It is questionable, however,
whether this legal unity will last much longer. Since the partition of
Germany into eastern and western zones, and particularly since the
foundation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Fed-
eral Republic in 1949, jurists and government officials in East Germany
have attacked the bourgeois civil code and asked for new "socialist"
civil law.
As early as 1952 at the Second Party Conference of the Socialist
Unity Party,2 Ulbricht suggested the theoretical necessity for a new
civil code. He reiterated his request at the Fifth Party Congress in
1958, after which legislative commissions were established to work
on the preparation of a draft code.3 Although the new code was orig-
inally intended to take effect on January 1, 1962,4 it has not yet been
t BA. 1960, LL.B. 1960, Ph.D. 1966, Free University of Berlin.1. Throughout this article the term "civil law" is used in its German sense, that is, in
contrast not to "common law" but to "public law." It thus closely corresponds to the
American notion of "private law."
2. The Socialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) is the ruling party of the
German Democratic Republic.
S. Due to political and doctrinal changes, new commissions were appointed after the
Sixth Party Congress in 1963.
4. Perspective plan of the East German Ministry of Justice, published in 12 NwuEJusriz 551, 552 (1958) [hereinafter cited as NJ].
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published even in draft form; however, the existence of an unpublished
draft-heavily criticized, but no less a point of departure-and the
gradual stabilization of East German civil law doctrine suggest that a
code may appear within two or three years.
East German deliberations about civil law reform have throughout
been influenced by Soviet politics, Soviet ideology, and Soviet legal
doctrine. It is the purpose of this article to investigate the scope of this
influence and to compare the solutions which Soviet and East German
jurists have proposed for the various problems connected with replac-
ing an inherited bourgeois legal system with a socialist legal system.
The East German developments will be traced chronologically, and each
stage examined for similarities and differences between the respective
German and Soviet positions in civil law thinking.
Many of the arguments discussed will seem highly conceptualistic.
Communist legal thinking in general tends to be far more dogmatic
than common law thinking. The combination of a civil law system
(with its emphasis on the general rule over the individual case and its
formally deductive rather than inductive method) and Marxist ideology
(with its belief in one right answer and intolerance for compromises
and tentative definitions) occasionally produces a formality and scho-
lasticism in legal thought reminiscent of nineteenth-century Begriffs-
jurisprudenz. In East Germany, this tendency has been reinforced by
the fact that the new civil code is supposed to be based on a conception
of civil law yet to be fully developed. Discussions in the GDR have thus
moved on a particularly theoretical level.
Nonetheless these disputes should not be dismissed as insignificant.
Communist legal debates, in the Soviet Union as well as in East Ger-
many, have to be looked at not so much as causes but as symptoms of
5. For discussion of the unpublished draft, see Ranke, Neues iikonomisches System und
aktuefle Probleme des sozialistischen Zivilrechts, 21 NJ 201 (1967); Panzer & Penig, Per-
tragsgesetz und Wirtschaftsrecht, 15 STAT UND RECHT 603 (1966) [hereinafter cited as STAAT
u. R.].
In a February 1967 article Hilde Benjamin, GDR Minister of Justice until July
1967, questioned whether the time was ripe for the legislation of a new East German
civil code. She referred in particular to the problem of German legal unity. Benjamin,
Sozialistische Gesetzgebung-eine der wichtigsten Formen staatlicher Leitung, 16 STAAT
u. R. 164 (1967). But only two months later, Hans Ranke, first representative of the
Minister of Justice, reported "considerable progress" in the field of civil law legislation
and declared:
The tasks of the comprehensive and complete construction of socialism in the GDR
call for the codification of these [civil law] relationships in a new civil code, especially
since the necessary conditions have now ripened.
Ranke, supra note 3, at 202. This looks very much like a reply to Benjamin, particularly
since the thought of German legal unity has not restrained the East German government
from the recent enactment of a new constitution and new codes in the areas of family law
and criminal law.
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social and political change. Even where theoretical tenets seem to have
no practical consequences, they are highly indicative of the underlying
political situation-more so than in the West, where changes find
easier and undisguised expression in the political process and where
theory and practice permeate each other far less. The intensity with
which even the most esoteric theoretical issues are debated in Com-
munist jurisprudence reflects the political significance attributed to
them: for the participants, these are not nice points of legal aestheti-
cism, but essential questions concerning society's progress towards
communism.
I. 1945-1952: The Early Years
In the years immediately before and after the foundation of the
GDR in 1949, Soviet influence on German civil law was restricted to
political influence and remained untranslated into legal concepts. The
legal problems created by the nationalization of large segments of in-
dustry after 1945, the land reform, and the introduction of the first
two-year plan in 1949 were treated practically, not theoretically. State
interference with private-law relationships had been common during
the war years, and its expansion still fit within the traditional legal
system. Furthermore, as long as the division of Germany was widely
regarded as temporary,6 there was little reason to question the adequacy
of traditional civil law. Very few East German jurists in the late forties
considered the use of the bourgeois BGB a political problem at all;
even those few Marxists who during their 6migr6 years had received
legal training and indoctrination in the USSR7 and who criticized the
formality and inadequateness of bourgeois norms said no more about
a new legal system than that it had to be "different." The only specific
suggestions for changes in civil law doctrine in this period, despite the
Marxist terminology in which they were phrased, had their origins in
6. The fading of belief in an early reunification of Germany was reflected in the
pages of the first East German legal periodical, Neue Justiz, founded in 1947. During itsfirst years Neue Justiz carried reports and bibliographies mainly on the literature of the
three Western Zones of Germany. In mid-1949 (the year of the foundation of both the
Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic) East German publications began
to receive more and more attention and by mid-1950 all 'West German periodicals were
dropped from the bibliography. At the end of 1951 even book reports on West German
literature were discontinued.
7. Like the late Karl Polak, later a member of the Staatsrat (comparable to the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) and legal advisor to the Central
Committee.
8. K. POLAx, JusrnzRNELmRuNG 42 (1948).
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the German school of interest-jurisprudence of the twenties and
thirties.9
To the extent that the creation of a new socialist law was discussed
at all, the discussion followed the Marxist doctrine that society's politi-
cal and legal superstructure depends on the development of its eco-
nomic base-its relationships of production. According to this doctrine,
East Germany, still lacking a socialist base, could not yet have a
socialist superstructure or, in particular, a socialist law. Socialist law
could replace bourgeois law only after "our new socialist forms of
economy ... are victorious over the old capitalist ones."' 0 This belief,
founded primarily on Marx's statement in the Critique of the Gotha
Program that "law can never be higher than the economic order and
the cultural development of society thereby conditioned,"" was one of
the reasons why the discussion about the legal nature of the new
Volkseigentum did not equate this "people's property" with socialist
state property as in the Soviet Union. Since East Germany's industry
and agriculture were only partially nationalized, its "mixed" economic
structure could not yet engender a "socialist" property right.
The quotation from the Critique of the Gotha Program also served
to refute suggestions that in a planned economy juridical relationships
preceded production relationships, a theory which would have made
possible the existence of socialist law in the GDR from the first.'
2
Pointing to Marx, Hilde Benjamin (later Minister of Justice) de-
nounced this notion as a misconception of historical materialism.'8 The
creation of a socialist legal system would apparently have to await the
creation of a completely socialized economy.
II. 1952-1958: Rehabilitating Inherited Law
Early in the new state's existence Marxist orthodoxy became bother-
some. On the one hand, allegiance to the Soviet Union demanded that
East Germany differentiate its law from German legal traditions; on
the other, the absence of an available substitute prevented the East Ger-
mans from simply discarding the legal institutions and concepts at
9. Such, Marxismus und Interessenjurisprudenz, 1 NJ 229 (1947); Die Ursachen des
Versagens der Rechtswissenschaft, 2 NJ 61 (1948); Jenseits von Materialisraus und Ideal.
ismus? 2 NJ 203 (1948).
10. K. POLAK, supra note 7, at 85.
11. Marx, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, in 2 K. MARX & F. ENcEtS, AusuW;{IzLT.
ScHRIFTEN IN zwEi BXNDEN 17 (1961).
12. Such, Recht und Rechtswissenshaft im Zweijahresplan, 8 NJ 178, 180 (1949).
13. Benjamin, Ober das Verhiltnis von Produktionsverhiltnissen und Rechtsverhlllt.
nissen, 3 NJ 305 (1949).
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hand. The inherited capitalist legal system in the GDR thus had to be
given socialist respectability.
In civil law the problem was particularly acute. Experience with the
first two-year plan had shown the impracticability of total planning.
With the first five-year plan, therefore, East Germany introduced in
1951 the so-called "General System of Contracts" (Allgemeines Ver-
tragssystem),14 which required state enterprises to translate their plan
obligations into contractual relationships among themselves, in order
to utilize the contract mechanism and its penalties to improve eco-
nomic performance. This new system-introduced in the Soviet Union
in 1928, at a similar stage of development'-called for socialist legiti-
mation of one of the key concepts of bourgeois civil law.
In other areas the use of traditional civil law concepts was no less
necessary. Volkseigentum, for instance, had to be accorded the quality
of state property to fall within the civil law provisions which tradition-
ally governed the activities of the capitalist fiscus,15 and in 1952 was in
fact declared to be "socialist state property."10 In general, the GDR at
this early stage could not afford to spend much time and effort question-
ing the validity of the BGB, which simply had to be cleansed of its bour-
geois disrepute. All the more so, since at the Second Party Conference in
July 1952, Ulbricht had declared that the GDR had entered the stage
of "construction of the foundations of socialism." Fortunately, civil law
doctrine in the Soviet Union during these years was itself rather dose,
at least in appearance, to continental legal traditions and did not stand
in the way of an East German rehabilitation of the German private law
system. Thus the main problem was not whether to continue to use
that system urfder new political conditions, but how to justify its use
ideologically.
A. Stalin's Influence
Stalin himself provided the solution to the problem of making bour-
geois law look like socialist law. In the summer of 1950 Pravda pub-
14. Decree of Dec. 6, 1951, [1951] Gesetzblatt der DDR 1141 (hereinafter cited as GBI].
15. Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law, in LAw L'v SovT-' Soci'ry
128, 179 (IV. LaFave ed. 1965).
15a. Traditional German legal doctrine distinguishes between the state's activities as
sovereign and as fiscus, that is, between the state as an administrative authority and the
state as a private law subject, contracting on an equal legal footing with other private law
subjects. In the former case, the state's activities are governed primarily by administrative
law rules; in the latter, by civil law rules. I shall use the term "fiscus" in the traditional
sense in order to indicate the continuity in the legal treatment of capitalist state property
and socialist people's property.
16. Dornberger, Die verschiedenen Eigentumsarten und Eigentumsformen und das
Eigentumsrecht in der DDR, 6 NJ 16 (1952).
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lished a discussion of Soviet linguistics to which Stalin contributed a
series of letters on Marxism and linguistics. These letters promul-
gated the theory of the active role of the superstructure, according to
which elements of the superstructure, such as law, not only reflect the
base but influence and shape it as well. From this one could conclude
that, contrary to Marx's statement in the Critique of the Gotha Pro-
gram, law could be-in fact, had to be-higher than the economic
order of a given society and that the legal system of the GDR, though
lacking a socialist base, could already be socialist in character.
After a time East German jurists did indeed draw this conclusion.
In June 1951 the propaganda department of the Central Committee of
the Socialist Unity Party held a conference on "the importance of
comrade Stalin's work on Marxism and Linguistics for the develop-
ment of sciences,"' 7 which was followed by a series of individual
conferences in different academic fields, including law.' 8 During the
following six years Stalin's Linguistic Letters, together with his last
work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,19 provided East
German civil-law theorists with their major arguments (and excuses)
in dealing with bourgeois law. Regardless of ideological merit, there-
fore, Stalin's theses deserve to be treated here in some detail.
1. The Active Role of the Superstructure
In the Linguistic Letters, Stalin described the superstructure as both
depending on and influencing its base. A change in the base, he argued,
causes a change in the superstructure, which then in turn strengthens
the base and "actively helps it to take shape and consolidate itself
..... ,0 From this the East German jurists reasoned that the bourgeois
BGB, now part of the new superstructure, was also performing new
functions. Since no base could have two superstructures-an old one
and a new one-both old and new laws in the GDR must of necessity
be serving socialist purposes:
Every civil law norm conforms to the base of our society and helps
as part of the superstructure to consolidate that base. This is true
also of the norms of sanctioned laws, the content of which is deter-
mined by our social order.21
17. Cf. Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, PROTOKOLL DER THEORETIsCIIEN KON-
FERENZ DER ABTEILUNG PROPAGANDA BEIM ZK DER SED AM 23.-24. JUNI 1951 (1952).
18. See Polak, Bericht fiber die Theoretische Konferenz fiber Fragen der Staats. und
Rechtswissenschaft am 15. und 16. Dezember 1951, 6 NJ 7 (1952).
19. J. STALIN, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR (1952).
20. J. STALIN, MARXISM AND LINGUISTICS 10 (1951).
21. Artzt, Die Rolle des Zivilrechts beim Aufbau des Sozialismus in der DDR, 10 NJ
67 (1956).
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This argument eliminated any apparent contradictions between old
and new norms in the East German legal system: bourgeois norms
could now be applied with a dear socialist conscience.
2. The Indifference of Language to Classes
The immediate topic of the Linguistic Letters-language-served
Stalin mainly as a vehicle to develop his views on superstructure and
base. Stalin denied the class-character of language. According to him,
it belongs neither to the base nor to the superstructure of a given social
order, but represents a third category, independent of and indifferent
to classes. Thus language is an instrument which like machinery or
mathematical rules can serve different societies equally well.
This theory could easily be extended to cover legal concepts. Al-
though Stalin did mention the phrase "to trade"22 among his linguistic
examples, he himself did not speak of legal rules but only of geometry,
which creates its laws by a process of abstraction from concrete
objects, regarding objects as bodies without any concreteness, and
defining the relationship between them, not as the concrete rela-
tions of concrete objects, but as the relations of bodies in general,
without any concreteness.P
But this description fitted the traditional civil law system perfectly. It
is not surprising, therefore, that both East German and Soviet - 4 jurists
felt justified in using bourgeois legal concepts as uncontaminated
tools. 25
3. Continued Commodity Production under Socialism
Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism supplied the most impor-
tant justification for the continued use of bourgeois legal concepts. In
this pamphlet, Stalin defended "commodity production"20 against
more utopian-minded party members who doubted that this originally
capitalist form of production could be reconciled with a socialist econ-
22. J. STALIN, MAzxuzs AND L NGUISICS 12 (1951).
23. Id. 24.
24. N. TMASHi FF, SozAuSr xcHE RE CHTsrHEORmN, 5 Osr-PRonLrm 147 (1953).
25. The East German professor Nathan, for instance, wrote in 1956 in defense of a
traditional structural argument:
If there is one teaching of Marxist dialectics which we had occasion to learn par-
ticularly thoroughly during the last years, it is the doctrine that no norm, no legal
method is "bad" in itself, but receives its value only in connection with concrete his-
torical drcumstances; in particular in connection with the social system under which
it is applied.
Nathan, Der Allgemeine Teil des Zivilrechts, 5 STAAT u;, R. 507, 509 (1956).
26. In Marxist terminology, "commodity production" refers to the production of goods
for exchange on the market rather than for direct distribution.
The Yale Law Journal
omy. Stalin admitted that commodity production and circulation
would eventually be replaced by the direct distribution of goods under
Communism, but he argued that this stage could come only after the
two existing production sectors-the state sector and the collective-
farm sector-were replaced by one all-embracing production sector.
Until then, he said, the production of goods for the market with its
accompanying economic laws would continue, although as commodity
production of " a special kind."27
Stalin thus defended, though only conditionally and far more reluc-
tantly than Communist economists today, a form of production that
Marxism had always identified with capitalist economy. The point has
legal significance because the exchange of commodities takes place
within the framework of traditional forms of civil law, especially con-
tract law, and the continuation of commodity production under social-
ism thus implies that the civil law rules for the exchange of goods must
continue to exist. At least this was the way East German civil-law schol-
ars interpreted Stalin. Professor Such wrote in 1953:
Stalin's statements about the prerequisites for continued commod-
ity production under socialism and about its special character are
of extreme importance for our contract law .... The continuation
of commodity production under our conditions implies that nu-
merous individual contract rules which are the juridic expression
of relationships under commodity production.., can be used and
exploited for the consolidation and development of the socialist
production relationships in our order.28
4. The Gradual Change of Social Conditions
A final argument against radical change in East German legal doc-
trine was derived from both the Linguistic Letters and Economic Prob-
lems of Socialism. Speaking about language, Stalin pointed out that the
transition of language from an old to a new quality does not occur "by
way of an explosion" but "by the gradual accumulation of the elements
of the new quality, and, hence, by the gradual dying away of the
elements of the old quality"-a theory which he extended from lan-
guage to social phenomena belonging to the superstructure and the
base as well.29
Stalin thus rejected the necessity of "explosions"-that is, of revolu-
27. J. STALIN, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR 17 (1952).
28. Such, Die Lehre von den Schuldverhitnissen im Lichte der Arbeit J. W. Stalinsfiber 6konomische Probleme des Sozialismus in der UdSSR, 2 STAAT u. R. 49, 58 (1953).
29. J. STALIN, MAMXSM AND LINGUISTICS 27 (1951).
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tion-as a prerequisite for all social change. He spelled this out in
Economic Problems of Socialism:
The fact of the matter is that in our socialist conditions economic
development proceeds not by way of upheavals, but by way of
gradual changes, the old not simply being abolished out of hand,
but changing its nature in adaptation to the new, and retaining
only its form; while the new does not simply destroy the old, but
infiltrates into it, changes its nature and its functions, without
smashing its form, but utilizing it for the development of the
new. 30
Applied to law, this meant that bourgeois legal concepts could, at least
for a time, acquire socialist content and serve socialist purposes without
having to change their traditional form. The notion was not entirely
Stalin's invention. It corresponded to the Marxist doctrine of the dia-
lectical relationship between form and content, according to which
both originally harmonize until a change in content creates a contra-
diction, which finally is resolved by the destruction of the old form
and the creation of a new one corresponding to the new content. But
Stalin played down the third step of the dialectical process. In this
respect he was followed by the East German jurists as well. Interested
primarily in the continued use of the traditional civil law system, they
contented themselves -with pointing to the "new" functions of old
norms which they did not bother to replace. The dynamic concept of a
dialectical contradiction between form and content thus was suspended
by a static concept of new socialist content in old bourgeois forms.
B. Bourgeois Forms with Socialist Content
Once they had assumed that under the new political conditions in
the GDR traditional civil law concepts had acquired new socialist con-
tent, East German scholars saw no reason for not applying them.
Moreover, since the new content supposedly came into existence
automatically with the change of the economic base, a special socialist
construction of old norms was not even necessary.31 Bourgeois norms
were granted the same dignity as the few newly legislated East German
provisions:
Our civil law is uniform in quality and class-character. The BGB
as well as other laws which originated under capitalism are com-
30. J. STALIN, EcoNoMIC PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 42.
31. Benjamin, Grundsetzliches zur Methode und zum Inhalt der Rechisprechung, 5 NJ
150, 152 (1951).
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ponents of the democratic civil law of the German Democratic
Republic. 32
This position legitimized the continued use of practically the entire
traditional German private law system. Civil-law relationships contin-
ued to be defined as legal relationships based on cooperation (in con-
trast to the subordination in relationships governed by administrative
law) and included contractual relationships between state enterprises.83
Accordingly, private law property rules governed the use and transfer
of state property-allegedly a qualitatively new concept in East Ger-
man civil law-as they generally govern that of fiscal property under
capitalism.34 The concept of contract, particularly needed after the
introduction of the Contract System in nationalized industry, occupied
a position of "great and continuously growing importance."3 The
occasional modifications of private law rules in these years were periph-
eral and did not involve conceptual changes: for example, the notion
of "good faith" which was now determined by the moral notions of
"the working class and its allies,"36 or the exclusion of bona fide pur-
chases of state-owned property. Purported changes in civil law doctrine,
such as the new distinction between means of production and means
of consumption,37 were not carried over into legal practice but re-
mained ideological embellishments of no consequence.
Despite constant declarations to the contrary, East German scholars
32. DAS ZIVILRECHT DER DDR-ALL EMEINER TEIL 12 (1955) (offlcial East German text-
book).
33. The traditional German legal problem of distinguishing between civil law andpublic law was posed by East German jurists as the problem of distinguishing civil lawfrom administrative law. The difference, however, is largely terminological. East Germanle a theory discards the concept of "public law" since it suggests that other areas of law
mnght not be "public" and thus might be outside the concern and Influence of the state.This in turn would imply the possibility of conflict between the interests of the Individual
and the state, a notion which until now has been unacceptable to East German legaldoctrine. That there are different ways of posing the question, however, does not do away
with the problem at hand: how to differentiate legal relationships between autonomous
citizens or juridic persons from those relationships in which the state Is Involved as
sovereign.
34. For the use of "fiscal" here see note 15a supra.On a theoretical level, Stalin did not consider means of production to be cominodi.ties, since the central ownership of the state excluded legal transfer of property in
means of production from one state enterprise to another. Nevertheless, he also provided
a justification for including them under the civil law rules governing commodity exchange.Since means of production, according to him, retained "the outward Integument of com-
modities," civil law was judged to be applicable to their transfer within the state economy
as well as outside it. J. STALIN, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS O' SOCIALISM IN THE USSR 41 (1952).35. Such, Die Bedeutung des Vertrapssystems fir die Zivilrechtsprechung, in PROTOKOLL
DER ERSTEN THEORETISCHEN KONFERENZ UBER FRAGEN DES ZIVILRErcTS AM 15. MARZ 1952, at
9 (1952).
36. DAs Zn'Iimcirr DER DDR, supra note 32, at 308 (1955).
37. A distinction which traditional bourgeois doctrine allegedly did not make In order
to conceal the use of means of production as instruments of exploitation.
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recognized that the conceptual differences between East and West
German civil law were negligible. Once more, this fact could be justi-
fied with the help of Stalin. Professor Such, referring to Economic
Problems of Socialism, wrote in 1953:
Until now we lacked sufficient theoretical explanation for the fact
that the definition of different contract relationships... did not
reveal their class-character. This class-character was and is visible
only through an analysis of the class position of the parties and of
the functions which contracts serve under different economic con-
ditions. Only this kind of analysis showed the essence of a concrete
contractual relationship and made it possible to reveal the funda-
mental difference between contracts under our law and capitalist
contracts.
Stalin's teachings about the continuation of commodity produc-
tion under socialism explain this particularity of contract defini-
tion. They demonstrate emphatically that commodity production
as well as its abstract juridic expression [in civil law] "must not be
regarded as something sufficient unto itself, something indepen-
dent of surrounding economic conditions"38 but that its concrete
quality ... must be determined on the basis of the specific laws of
a particular form of society.39
Whether a civil law concept is capitalist or socialist in character, then,
does not depend upon its particular legal characteristics but upon the
political and economic conditions under which it is applied. Given
this premise, all that was necessary to demonstrate the new quality of
East German civil law was to point to the nationalization of industry
and to political changes in the GDR.
C. Revisionism
Political circumstances further encouraged the acceptance of bour-
geois legal concepts, already rendered palatable by the doctrine of
their new socialist content. Moscow's reconciliation with Belgrade in
May 1955-with its implicit Soviet recognition of a separate Yugo-
slavian way to socialism-and the Twentieth Party Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 brought about
a two-year period of revisionism in East Germany, which mainly by
way of economics affected law as well. 0 The revisionists directed their
main attacks against the oppressive centralism and bureaucratism of
the East German party state. The economists Fritz Behrens and Arne
58. J. STALIN, ECONOZ eC PROBLMS, supra note 27, at 15.
59. Such, Die Lehre von den Schuldverhdltnissen, supra note 28, at 59.
40. M. JXmcEEF, DER DanTY Wfo 77, 112 (19$).
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Benary in particular criticized the suffocating omnipresence of the
state and demanded a democratization of the economic process: re-
placement of the centralized state-apparatus with a system of economic
self-management of individual enterprises, reliance on economic in-
stead of administrative methods, greater trust in and opportunity for
the spontaneous cooperation of the masses and finally, as a consequence
of the postulated dismantling of the centralized administrative appara-
tus, a gradual withering away of the state.41
The revisionist jurists were less outspoken, but their criticism ran
in the same vein. The legal theorist Klenner, for instance, defined law
as "a kind of touchstone for the reality content .. .of human think-
ing,"' 42 thus implying that the validity of a law should depend on its
public acceptance-a test which in effect would subject the party itself
to spontaneous criticism. 43 Professor Such stressed the autonomy of
contracts in East Germany's planned economy and declared that non-
fulfillment of a contract was a "critique by the sphere of praxis of a
shortcoming in some phase of the preceding total process of planning
and execution,"44 thus also ascribing an important role to a form of
spontaneous criticism from below. 45 Other jurists advocated-on a
more practical level-the admission of bankruptcy proceedings against
state-owned enterprises, 46 a suggestion which reflected Behrens's and
Benary's demands for the economic independence of individual state
enterprises and for the supremacy of economic over administrative
criteria in the ordering of the economy.
On the whole, however, the revisionist influences on civil law during
the years 1955-1957 did not lead, as in other intellectual fields, to a
preoccupation with Reform-Communist ideas, but rather to an open
return to pre-Communist civil law concepts and doctrines. This reac-
tion can be explained by the weight of the traditional civil law system
41. Id. 104. For East German criticism see Weichelt, Ober die Rolle des sozialistischen
Staates in der Ubergangsperiode vom Kapitalismus zunm Sozialisnus, 6 STAT v. R. 221
(1957); Steiniger, Zu drei Fragen der marxistisch-leninistischen Revolutionstheorie, 6 STAAT
u. R. 329, 349 (1957).
42. Klenner, Zur ideologischen Natur des Rechts, in STAAT UND RcuT 1M LicirrE Drs
GROSSEN OKTOBER 82, 84 (1957).
43. Klenner also declared it to be the task of socialist ideology to "march at the head
of the spontaneous movement" and accepted as good socialist law only law which did so.
Id. 101.
44. Such, Die Rolle des sozialistischen Rechts bei der Leitung der Wirtschaft, in STAAT
UND RECHT iM LiCHTE DEs GROSSEN OKToBER 336, 362 (1957).
45. Such admitted this criticism to be spontaneous but called for the lifting of "the
spontaneity of this critique into consciousness in order to help eliminate shortcomings at
an early stage." Id. 362.
46. Reported by Ulbricht at the Babelsberg Conference, PROTOKOLS. DER s'rAATs- UND
RECHTSWISSENSCHA='TICHEN KONFERENZ IN ABELSBERRG 28 (1958).
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still in use in the GDR and only formally repudiated by the theory of
its new socialist content. Under the temporary relaxation of the politi-
cal atmosphere, the "new socialist content" was progressively ignored.
In universities lecturers would separate "old forms" and "new content"
by giving a political introduction and then teaching straight tradi-
tional law.47 The use of old commentaries and textbooks was wide-
spread; law schools even began to ask for more West German litera-
ture.48 East German civil law doctrine, until then carefully disguised as
socialist, began giving up its pretenses.
But if the period of revisionism did not affect East German civil law
doctrine more than by bringing its traditional character out in the
open, it is yet important for another reason. Revisionism did not basi-
cally change civil law theory up to 1957; but without an understanding
of the Party's reaction to revisionism and the total change in intellec-
tual climate accompanying it, civil law development during the follow-
ing years would be incomprehensible. This reaction set in at the 30th
plenary session of the Central Committee early in 1957, at which the
party, in Ulbricht's words, "proceeded to the counter-attack"40 and at
which the major revisionists, among them Behrens, were officially
criticized. o From then on the dominant role of the state was stressed
against all earlier notions of participation or criticism from below.
The role of the state was also the main topic of discussion at a confer-
ence on general questions of law and the state held in Babelsberg in
April 1958. Organized by the Central Committee and headed by Ul-
bricht, the Babelsberg conference established the direction of all legal
development during the following years. Ulbricht again attacked
Behrens and Benary for their "revisionist theory of the dismantling of
the state,"51 rebuked revisionists like Klenner5-2 and Such53 for mis-
understanding the class-character and function of socialist law, and
then spelled out this function: law had to be an instrument of the
state for the transformation of society.54 It would be judged by its
47. B6nninger at the Babelsberg conference, in id. 62.
48. Schirmer at the Babelsberg conference, in id. 100.
49. M. JXNIcKE, supra note 40, at 84.
50. Id.
51. Ulbricht at the Babelsberg conference, PRoTOKOLL, supra note 46, at 28.
52. Id. 29. For further criticism of Klenner see Helmbrecht, "Zur ideologischen Natur
des Rechts" im Lichte des Grossen Oktober, 7 STAAT u. R. 244 (1958).
53. PROTOKOLL, supra note 46, at 36. For additional criticism of Such, see Panzer, Zur
Rolle des sozialistischen Zivilrechts bei der Verwirldichung der WVirtschaftspldne, 7
STAAT u. R. 535 (1958).
54. PROTOKOLL, supra note 46, at 40: "Our science of state and law (cani do iustice to
its tasks only by approaching problems of our state and law from the viewpoint of its
role in the process of revolutionary transformation, from the viewpoint of its role in the
formation of the new socialist society."
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efficiency as a tool for state purposes: "The criterion for the scientific
character of our theory of state and law is its usefulness in the praxis of
the construction of socialism."55 Ulbricht's concept of law as a trans-
mission belt between the leading state and the led masses ran counter
to everything the revisionists had wanted to achieve: instead of decen-
tralization, spontaneous participation from below, and the eventual
withering away of state and law, it meant more administrative interfer-
ence, conscious ideological guidance from above, and a strengthening
of state and law. The educative function of law was particularly stressed
after the Babelsberg conference. A self-critical editorial in the leading
legal journal Staat und Recht stated in 1958:
It is the main task of the science of state and law in the German
Democratic Republic to educate men . . . to think in terms of
dialectical materialism in dealing with questions of state and law,
and to propagate insight into the requirements for development of
our state and law during the construction of socialism. 0
Civil law doctrine reacted accordingly. Instead of primarily defining
and ordering the relationships of conflicting interests, civil law was
now above all supposed to generate socialist consciousness:
Civil law is not an immediate instrument for regulating economic
processes . . . but, as a manifestation of the will of the socialist
state, it is an instrument to influence the consciousness of our
people.5 7
With the inherited civil law system still in use in the GDR, such a
goal was unattainable. In order to exploit "the great mobilizing force
of civil law,"5' 8 East Germany would need, first of all, a new kind of
civil law. Accordingly, when Ulbricht announced the beginning of the
new stage of the "completion of socialism" in the GDR at the Fifth
Party Congress in July 1958 (three months after the Babelsberg con-
ference), he also asked for a series of new laws, among them new codes
of civil law and civil procedure. 9 Work on the new civil code started
immediately.
55. Id. 30.
56. Der gegenwirtige Stand und die weiteren Aulgaben der Zeitschrift "Staat und
Recht," 7 STAAT u. R. 350 (1958).
57. Panzer, supra note 53, at 537.
58. Hofmann & Krauss, Uber revisionistische Erscheinungen im Zvilrecht, 7 STAAT
u. R. 547, 560 (1958).
59. 1 PROTOKOLL DES V. PARTETAGES DR SED 55 (1959).
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III. 1958-1961: Searching for "Socialist" Civil Law
The three years following the Babelsberg conference and the Fifth
Party Congress are the most radical, the most dogmatic, and the most
creative in the short history of East German civil law. While at all
other periods of its development East German theorists relied at least
to some extent on Soviet doctrine for support, the theories developed
after Babelsberg seem to be independent of-even largely contradic-
tory to-such doctrine. Efforts during these years to create a "socialist"
civil law system ignore practical considerations and show little aware-
ness of the course of Soviet legal history. In a way, they seem very
German in their intense, if critical, preoccupation with the traditional
key concepts of German private law dogma, such as the "subjective
right," Without delineating in any detail the devious routes by which
they were reached, I will first describe the most striking tenets of civil
law doctrine during these years, then look for Soviet parallels.
A. Civil Law vs. Economic Law
Until 1958, civil law in East Germany had been distinguished from
administrative law by its specific method of legal regulation: coordina-
tion of the parties instead of subordination of one participant under
the other. After Babelsberg, this traditional distinction was criticized
as abstract, formal, and lacking a "political message."co It was to be
replaced by a systematization based not on the method but on the
purpose of legal regulation: regardless of juridic distinctions each
branch of law should provide concrete guidelines for a concrete area
of activities. This legislative goal of having different branches of law
correspond to different complexes of societal life soon led to the sepa-
ration of civil and "economic" law.
1. Economic Law
While until 1958 business relationships between state enterprises
had been governed by civil law, it was now held that all legal relation-
ships in the field of the state economy should be embraced by one new
branch of law, Such an "economic law," in this form unknown to tradi-
tional German legal doctrine, would combine horizontal relationships
bet-ween the different state enterprises (contracts) with vertical rela-
tionships between individual enterprises and the administrative au-
60. Kleine, Ober die Konzeption des neuen Zivilgesetlbuches der Deutsjaen Demo-
kratischen Republik, 8 STAAT u. R. 232, 233 (1959).
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thorities responsible for their economic performance. It would thus be
an amalgam of former civil and administrative law elements.
The justification for distinguishing contracts within the state econ-
omy from contracts between individual citizens or between citizens
and state enterprises such as state-owned department stores was found
in the decisive influence of planning on the first type of contract. The
civil law classification of contractual relationships between state enter-
prises before 1958 had concentrated on the rights and duties of theimmediate parties and had left the influence of planning (and thus of
the state) to other branches of law. With the new insistence on the
transformation of society from above, however, the state was to re-enter
these exchange relationships as an immediate participant. Contracts
between state enterprises, it was now said, could not be understood
without taking their planning aspects into account; a neat legal sepa-
ration between their horizontal and their vertical elements would be
impossible. Both elements of planned contracts, therefore, had to be
governed by one legal discipline, which would be the expression of
democratic centralism in the area of the economy, dialectically com-
bining its centralistic aspects-planning-with its "democratic" aspects
-economic cooperation between state enterprises.
Practically speaking, however, centralism far outweighed coopera-
tion in the new economic law.61 Given the emphasis on the state in this
period, the combination of administrative and civil law elements in
one branch of law took place at the expense of the civil law elements.
Suspicious of the voluntaristic and individualistic features of civil law
traditions, the post-Babelsberg economic law theorists tended to ne-
glect problems of horizontal economic cooperation between state enter-
prises and concentrated instead on the "perfection of state guidance"
(a favorite slogan in these years) through directives from above. The
legal position of the individual enterprise in East Germany's economy
became a problem of secondary importance. Even the Contract System
which had been introduced in 1951-the system of contractual instead
of administrative distribution of goods within the state-owned econ-
omy-was occasionally called into question. Hemmerling, for instance,
asked in 1961 "whether after all it is still correct to speak of a contract
61. Definitions of democratic centralism in this period placed the centralist aspect
very much in the foreground. Heuer, for instance, spoke of democratic centralism as
the "principle of the guidance of socialist society through the socialist state," a definition
omitting the democratic aspect completely. Normally, the democratic pole of democratic
centralism would be mentioned, but it would not receive much attention. Heuer, Demo-
kratischer Zentralismus und sozialistische Moral, 4 VERmrAGssYsTEM 99 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as VS].
Vol. 78: 1, 1968
Civil Law in East Germany
system or whether this conceptual approach may not, in the long run,
create ideological obstacles to the development of the complex plan-
ning and guiding [of the economy]."0 2 No longer were contracts viewed
primarily as mechanisms for coordinating interests between two enter-
prises, but as "a means of [state] power, an instrument of [state]
guidance."63 "Economic accountancy"-requiring state enterprises to
achieve profitability on the basis of their own individual accounts"-
was declared to be "not simply an economic lever, but mainly a polit-
ical principle: a method of educating the workers .... a mirror image
of the degree of maturity of consciousness of the collective in ques-
tion."65 Economic incentives were viewed with suspicion as an appeal
to capitalist instincts instead of socialist responsibility."" Not the alloca-
tion of material advantages or disadvantages, but new consciousness
was to be the socialist answer to old problems. Above all the struggle
to fulfill contracts (a perpetual problem for East German officials be-
cause of the ill-functioning of economic sanctions for nonfulfillment)
was supposed to rely primarily not on material incentives but on
"socialist consciousness as the decisive force."137 No wonder that the
violation of contracts was viewed above all as "a moral question." s
The new doctrine of economic law thus showed the typical features
of a reaction to revisionism: stress on consciousness instead of sponta-
neity, on administrative instead of economic methods, on planning
instead of the contractual initiative of the individual enterprise, on
the interests of the state instead of those of the individual. Preoccupa-
tion with the educative role of law, furthermore, produced an ideologi-
cal perfectionism which left little room for practical deliberation.
Much of the energy of economic law scholars was spent on translating
political tenets into legal concepts, delineating different branches of
law, and developing ideologically correct definitions. Nor were these
62. Hemmerling, Drei Jahre Vertragsgesetz, 5 VS 33, 37 (1951).
63. Id. 54.
64. This was a main feature of the contract system, introduced by decree of March 20.
1952, [1952] GB1 225.
65. Hemmerling, Zum Verhaltnis von demokratischem Zentralimus und wirtschalt-
licher Rechnungsfzihrung bei der Leitung der sozialistischen Wirtschaft, 8 STAAT u. R.
879, 888 (1959).
66. Heuer, supra note 61, at 105:
A system of material incentives is not only an expression of the stage of productive
forces but also an expression of an as yet insufficiently developed socialist conscious-
ness, of the contradiction between narrow (subjective) personal interests and the
interests of society.
67. Pfficke, Die Bedeutung des sozialistischen Bewusstseins und der matferellen Inter-
essiertheit bei der Bekampfung von Vertragsverletzungen, 4 VS 161, 165 (1960).
68. Id.
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characteristics restricted to the development of economic law doctrine.
They can be found in the civil law doctrine of this period as well.
2. Civil Law
With exchange relationships within the state-owned economy trans-
ferred to the new discipline of economic law, civil law was to be left
with the sphere of consumption. It was to embrace all legal relation-
ships among individual citizens as well as their relationships to state-
owned stores or public utility organizations, including those to such
administrative authorities as housing or public health agencies, which
formerly would have been covered by administrative law. In accor-
dance with the consciousness-forming role of law, the future civil code
in this area would organize and eventually help to collectivize the
traditionally individual business of providing for the material needs of
oneself and one's family, making them a matter of general social con-
cern. The civil code, therefore, should not merely offer instructions
for the decision of possible conflicts of interest; it should also serve as
a manual for socialist behavior. Devised as a means of political educa-
tion, it would have to be ideologically persuasive and understandable,
speak a simple language, contain as few legal abstractions as possible,
have a structure geared to the different areas of consumption (e.g.,
sales, leases, housing), and demonstrate the importance of social over
individual interests.
The aim is really this: that being provided with food, clothing,
housing and cultural goods must in the minds of our people cease
to be a private affair and be understood as a matter of public con-
cern, with every citizen in our republic entitled and obligated to
participate in its organization. 9
Two examples will illustrate how East German civil law theorists tried
to achieve this goal.
a. The Subjective Right
Favorite child of German civil law doctrine, the subjective right 70
was particularly obnoxious to East German jurists. Viewed by tradi-
69. H. KIrZ & M. MOHLMANN, Dm ERZIEHUNGSAUFGABEN IM ZIVILIPROzWS 39 (1962).
70. The German term subjektives Recht is here translated ag "subjective right" since
the simple translation as "right," although less confusing to a common law reader,
would fail to convey the dogmatic weight attributed to this concept in German law.
The subjective right is a general concept for any legally enforceable right of the Indi-
vidual. Subjective rights thus are the subjective counterparts of the objective body of
laws (objeklives Recht) on which enforceable individual claims are based. Although not
confined to the area of private law (subjective rights exist in public law as well, e.g.,
civil rights), private law doctrine is centered around this concept and contributed most
to its systematic development.
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tional theory as a legally protected private enclave for the individual,
it was now in East Germany seen as "in reality demarcating the elbow-
room of the individual capitalist."71 East German scholars in this period
saw the subjective right primarily as a negative concept, a legal weapon
directed against others, warding off society. Since during these years
the possibility of contradictions between the interests of the individual
and those of society was not admitted theoretically-the two merging
in the interest of the state-the traditional doctrine of subjective rights
was to be "demolished down to the foundations."72
Of course this could not mean that the future civil code should con-
tain no property or obligatory rights; but these rights should be geared
to the needs of society as well as the individual. For example, instead
of treating property as a primarily exclusive right,73 the civil code
should take into consideration the general functions of personal prop-
erty under socialism-in particular, the consumption function. Instead
of placing the right to dispose of one's property at the center of legal
regulation, as does the BGB, the new code should focus instead on the
rights of possession and use.74 In order to reduce the private and auton-
omous nature of civil law relations even further, it was planned to
introduce into the civil code provision for collectives like house-com-
mittees or store-committees, which (beyond their established political
functions) were to be legally entitled to participate in quarrels and law
suits concerning certain civil law claims, such as those arising out of
rents or sales. This innovation would at least have influenced the cli-
mate in which individuals assert their rights, and thus indirectly those
rights themselves.
On the whole, however, the suggestions for getting away from the
doctrine of subjective right were not very convincing. The proposed
changes were largely doctrinaire and more concerned with ideological
than with legal clarifications. A case in point was the theory that under
socialist conditions the traditional German distinction between sub-
jective right (the individual claim) and objective law (the body of law
giving rise to that claim) was superfluous-a thesis supposed to demon-
71. Oberlimder, Zur Regelung der Pflichten des sozialistichen Handels im Iilnftigen
Zivilgesetzbuch, 15 NJ 13 (1961).
72. Arlt, Freiheit und Recht, 10 STAAT u. R. 795, 798 (1961).
73. See Section 903 of the BGB: "The owner of a thing is entitled, as far as the rights
of others allow, to dispose of the thing as he pleases and to exclude others from any
interference with it."
74. From this, for instance, would follow the abolition of certain types of mortgages
provided for in the BGB, which serve as negotiable instruments rather than as ,ecurity
for debts connected with the property. Oechler & Rohde, Einigc Probleme des Boden-
rechts und ihre Regelung im kfinftigen ZiVilgesetzbuch. 15 NJ 567, 572 (1961).
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strate the identity of individual and societal interests under socialism.
Posch wrote on this subject:
The law itself and its realization through society ... are the direct
guarantees of the realization of rights and duties. It is no longer
necessary to differentiate between objective law and a separate
subjective right which must serve as the individual's weapon in his
fight for existence. The dogmatic juxtaposition of objective law as
the general legal order and subjective right as private legal power
has no foundation in a socialist society. 5
No practical conclusions about the limitation or abolition of individ-
ual rights were drawn from this thesis. But the attempt typifies the
ideological attitude of the period, both the eagerness to dissociate East
German civil law completely from its bourgeois past and the dogmatic
and fundamentalist way of doing so.
b. Contracts
The most important area of contract law, the exchange relation-
ships between state enterprises, had already been taken over by eco-
nomic law. This left to civil law only contracts between citizens and
state enterprises (chiefly public utilities) and between citizens them-
selves. Civil law doctrine reduced the importance of the remaining
contract law still further. The concept of contract, like the concept of
subjective right, was regarded as a bourgeois phenomenon which re-
quired total remodeling to be acceptable under socialism. In capitalist
society, it was said, contracts were necessary as artificial bonds to unite
temporarily otherwise isolated individuals and hence had to be used to
explain all kinds of social organizations, from the contrat social to the
marriage contract. Under socialism, however, with the interests of
individual and society no longer opposed, social relationships would
not have to rely on temporary ties, and contracts would necessarily lose
significance. This theory was most completely developed in connection
with the rules which were to govern the relationships between citizens
and socialist trade organizations. Following a theory first developed by
Posch, 76 it was postulated that a permanent legal bond, a kind of gen-
eral socialist status relationship, already existed between the citizen
and "his" state-owned trade organizations. This so-called "general ju-
ridic relationship" (allgemeines Rechtsverhidltnis) was supposed to in-
75. Posch, Das Rechtsverhditnis im Zivilrecht, 10 STAAT U. R. 15, 26 (1961).
76. Posch, Das Rechtsverhiiltnis im Zivilrecht, 10 STAAT U. R. 15 (1961); Posch, Ober-
windung privatrechtlicher Vorstellungen im Zivilrecht, 13 NJ 837 (1959).
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dude all basic rights and duties of state-owned shops and department
stores and of consumers. Under the new civil code particular contracts
would be required only to specify additional rights and obligations-in
cases of purchases on an installment plan, for example.
The concept of the general juridic relationship was in a sense a
conceptualistic attempt to extend the influence of civil law beyond the
individual's initiative, for this legal relationship would have existed
without and even against the individual's volition. The theory thus
reflected the expansion of state interference typical of this period. But
while great effort was expended on the elaboration of this favorite
theme of East German civil law scholars, it is difficult to see how the
concept could have been applied in practice. A "general juridic rela-
tionship" might have been possible in those state-consumer relation-
ships where prices and all other terms of business were already legally
fixed; there one could just as well speak of standardized contracts,
especially since some kind of offer and the acceptance of the consumer
would still be necessary. Everywhere else, it would seem, East German
doctrine would be forced to fall back on traditional contracts, as indeed
it did, although it tried to interpret the elements of offer and accep-
tance as objectively as possible, placing subjective elements-for in-
stance, intent in cases of mistake-in the background.7 The theory of
the general juridic relationship failed at least in part because it tried
to anticipate by way of legal institutions social conditions not yet in
existence-in particular, direct distribution of consumer goods, pre-
dicted only for the final stage of Communism.
B. Soviet Parallels
As noted earlier, East German legal development after the Babels-
berg conference must be understood as a reaction to revisionist stirrings
in the wake of Soviet de-Stalinization. To this extent civil and eco-
nomic law developments in the GDR, although a consequence of Soviet
events, do run counter to the liberalizing trends set off by the Twen-
tieth Party Congress. It is interesting to inquire, therefore, whether
Soviet influences continued to be felt in East German law and whether
Soviet legal history provides any precedents for the post-Babelsberg
developments. To trace such influences and the parallels between East
German and Soviet civil law thinking requires a review of Soviet legal
history.
77. Posch, Der Vertrag im Zivilrecht, 9 STAA U. R. 1768, 1786 n.30 (196 ).
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1. War Communism
During the first years after the Revolution, attempts were made to
run the Soviet economy without the help of traditional bourgeois civil
law, particularly without contracts. Practically all contractual relation-
ships within the economy were replaced in August 1918 by a system of
direct distribution of products, working exclusively with bookkeeping
entries.78 In 1920 several decrees relating to consumption ordered the
abolition of any payment for rationed goods, fuel, communal housing,
or postal and telegraphic services. 70 All private ownership of land and
the right of inheritance were abolished. 0 In addition to the expropria-
tion of banking, shipping and insurance businesses, and of all but the
smallest industrial enterprises,8' private property rights on a more
modest level were largely disregarded by both central and local Soviet
authorities.8 2
But similarities between actual practices during the early Soviet
years and the legal theorizing of East German civil law doctrine after
Babelsberg, especially the common disdain for contracts and individual
rights, are misleading. While the East Germans believed enough in law
and the adjudicative process to work on new codes in civil law and
procedure, the Soviets distrusted all formalized legal procedure and
relied instead on revolutionary justice. Their early decrees were an
attempt to move away from the rigidity of law itself, not just from
bourgeois law. Pre-revolutionary laws were to be applied only if they
harmonized with "revolutionary conscience and consciousness of Jus-
tice." 83 Even new Soviet decrees were not sacrosanct but were viewed
merely as political guidelines; 84 they could be disregarded if "extraordi-
nary circumstances of the civil war and the combat of counterrevolu-
tion" 85 required it. In contrast to the East German jurists of the
Babelsberg period, Soviet jurists during these years wasted no energy
on the development of new theoretical concepts. In contrast also to
the traditional German faith in legal expertise, they assumed "that the
fundamental problems of social administration were very simple, and
78. Loeber, supra note 15, at 18.




83. According to article 5 of the First Decree on the Courts of November 27, 1917, as
reported in R. SCHLSINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY 63 (1945).
84. Lenin wrote in 1917: "It does not matter that many points in our decrees will
never be carried out; their task is to teach the masses how to take practical steps ....We shall not look at them as absolute rules .... Quoted by K. Gazvyowsxi, SovIEr IEGAL
INsTrruTIONs 42 (1962).
85. Decree of November 8, 1918, Quoted by V. Gsovsmu, supra note 79, at 154.
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could dispense with the elaborate legal machinery accessible only to
specialists." 6
The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in May 1921
marked the end of such beliefs in the feasibility and simplicity of
administrative solutions, especially in relation to the economy. As
Lenin wrote in 1921:
It was intended to exchange in a more or less socialist manner...
the products of industry for the products of agriculture ... But
what happened? ... Nothing came of the exchange of goods, the
private market proved to be stronger than we and instead of an
exchange of goods we ended up with ordinary purchase and sale,
trade.87
The return to more orthodox economic forms entailed a return to
civil law methods as well. From now on, codification of Soviet law
replaced the system of ad hoc decrees. The experiments in revolu-
tionary justice were over.
2. The NEP Period
As far as legal philosophy is concerned, the NEP period represents
no deviation from the early revolutionary years, but a logical, if more
realistic, continuation. Expectations about how quickly Communism
could be attained were less optimistic, but the attitude toward law re-
mained basically the same.
Outwardly, there seemed to be a renaissance of bourgeois law. The
restoration of civil law, begun with a decree of May 1922 entitled "On
Fundamental Private Property Rights Recognized by the Union of
Soviet Republics, Secured by Its Law, and Protected by Its Courts,"
was completed with the enactment of the Civil Code of the Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic in October 1922. Many of the
Code's provisions were virtually copied from Western codes, especially
the BGB. Unlike the BGB, the Russian code excluded family law and
included commercial law, but from its conceptual framework down to
individual provisions it was "strongly reminiscent" of the Western
European legal tradition."" Only occasionally was its conventionality
modified in favor of the state: especially by Section 1, "Civil rights
shall be protected by law except in instances where they are exercised
86. R. ScrmSn;GER, supra note 83, at 65.
87. Quoted by Loeber, supra note 15, at 129.
88. Westen, The New Codes of Civil Law, 14 PRonL.M or Co.miuIsm 34, 35 (1965).
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in contradiction with their social-economic purposes," and by a num-
ber of other provisions safeguarding state interests.89
The contrast between these rules and the traditional provisions of
the code is symptomatic. The Civil Code of 1922 was conceived as a
bourgeois code, to be used temporarily for reasons of expediency.
Little effort was made to mitigate its conservatism or to hide its pro-
visional character. The NEP code so unashamedly drew on traditional
Western European legislation as well as on an old Russian draft code
prepared under the Czarist regime, 0 in fact, that its drafting took only
four months.!" In a textbook on Soviet economic law, edited by Pa-
shukanis and Gintsburg, it was frankly admitted that "separate specific
'soviet' articles were sprinkled here and there . . . amidst a mass of
articles from bourgeois codes." 92
This legislative method was consistent with the general tenor of
legal thinking during the NEP years. Not only was it assumed that law
together with the state would wither away under Communism (at least
for the final stage of Communism this was never disputed in Soviet
ideology), but it was also believed that the legal provisions temporarily
necessary during the transition period would have to be bourgeois law,
not some kind of socialist law. By extending Marx's analysis of com-
modity exchange from economics to law, Pashukanis developed this
most clearly. For him, all law (not just private law, although Pashu-
kanis saw private law as law par excellence) is an expression of the
exchange of goods on the market. Such exchanges demand a mutual
recognition of property rights,9 3 and law furnishes the framework in
which such recognition takes place. As for Marx value provides the
common denominator which enables the exchange of otherwise in-
commensurable goods on the market, for Pashukanis law provides the
formal equality necessary for the regulation of this exchange. The
economic exchange relationship takes on the legal form of the juridical
relationship; commodity dealers are abstracted into legal subjects. Law
is thus the "inevitable reflection"04 of commodity exchange. Since this
89. Section 4: legal capacity is not acquired at birth but granted by the state "for
the development of the creative forces of the country"; Section 18: juridical persons
can be dissolved if their activity is contrary "to the interests of the state"; Sectfon S0:legal transactions are void if "directed against the obvious prejudice of the state"; Section
60: no bona fide purchase of state property.
90. Gsovski, The Soviet Concept of Law, 7 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1, 27 (1938).
91. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RussiA 25 (1950).
92. Yudin, Socialism and Law, in SovIEr PHILOSOPHY 281, 291 (H. W. Babb transl.
1951).
93. 1 K. MARX, DAs KAPrrAL 90 (1955).
94. Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, in SovIEr LEGAL PuLtosoPI'Y
111, 138 (H. W. Babb transl. 1951).
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mode of distribution of goods has reached its highest form under capi-
talism, capitalist law is law in its highest and final stage. There is no
law beyond it:
The dying out of the categories. .. of bourgeois law by no means
signifies that they are replaced by new categories of proletarian
law-precisely as the dying out of the category of value, capital,
gain, and so forth will not (with the transition to expanded social-
ism) mean that new proletarian categories of worth, capital, rent,
and so forth appear. The dying out of the categories of bourgeois
law will in these conditions signify the dying out of law in gen-
eral.... 9 5
Pashukanis's conclusions, if not his reasoning, were shared by his
colleagues. For them as well, law was a bourgeois, not a socialist phe-
nomenon. Goikhbarg wrote in 1923: "We refuse to see in law an idea
useful to the working class"; 90 Reisner, more carefully, wrote in the
same year: "We still do not know whether we need law, and to what
extent we need it";97 and Stuchka, in 1927: "Communism means not
the victory of socialist law, but the victory of socialism over any law,
since with the abolition of classes with their antagonistic interests, law
will disappear altogether."98 As a result of these theories, civil law
during the NEP period was tolerated but otherwise neglected. Since it
was bourgeois law, the notion of traditional bourgeois "legality" was
for the time being accepted. The private rights guaranteed in the NEP
code were thus given a certain stability. But apart from its temporary
usefulness for the NEP, law was granted no future. Under Pashukanis's
influence even the teaching of civil law was discontinued in Soviet uni-
versities, except for a few hours devoted to bourgeois law of the Soviet
Union at the end of the year.9 9 No one during the NEP years ever
dreamed of developing a new "socialist" civil law.
The difference from East German teachings after the Babelsberg
conference is obvious. The East Germans, planning to replace bour-
geois civil law by socialist civil law, not only wanted to preserve the
category of law, but intended to use it as an instrument for the creation
of socialist society. With the help of law, they hoped to bring about
social conditions which the NEP jurists believed would exist only after
the withering away of all law: for example, direct use of public utilities
95. Id. 111, 122.
96. V. Gsovsm, Sov=r Civit. LAw 163 (1948).
97. Id.
98. Id. 170.
99. Hazard in his introduction to Sovirr LEGAL PmLOSOrny, supra note 92, at xxxi.
The Yale Law Journal
without contracts (though still on a limited scale and not yet without
the use of money) or participation of citizens in the administration of
consumer-good distribution. The East Germans, at first sight more
radical than the NEP jurists in their rejection of bourgeois law, were
in reality much less radical.
The same is true of their separation of civil and economic law, which
appears to echo Soviet ideas developed during the NEP period. But
the differences between the East German and Soviet attitudes toward
law in general are reflected in different concepts of economic law
as well. The theory of economic law appeared in the Soviet Union
after the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928, which was
aimed at the immediate construction of socialism. Based on the experi-
ences of the NEP with its two economic sectors (private and planned),
Soviet scholars saw economic law as an outgrowth of the planned sector
and as antithetical to the bourgeois civil law of the NEP code. This
followed directly from Pashukanis's commodity-exchange conception of
law.100 If law served as a mediator between conflicting interests of
commodity owners exchanging their goods, then the absence of con-
flicting interests in an economy owned by the state alone and run like a
gigantic factory must render this law superfluous. In Pashukanis's
words:
The opposition of private interests is ... a fundamental premise
of legal regulation. At the same time this is a logical premise of
the juridic form .... Conversely, unity of purpose is a premise of
technical regulation. 101
Pashukanis accordingly distinguished between two modes of regulating
the economy: "the purely juridic-that is to say, the legal form" with
"links between economic units expressed in the form of the value of
circulating goods," and the method "of direct-that is to say, techni-
cally fertile-instructions in the forms of programs and plans of pro-
duction and distribution and so on."'102 The first method was bourgeois
civil law and was doomed to disappear under Communism. The second
method was a kind of nonlaw or antilaw, involving technical instruc-
tions and direct regulations that were supposed to survive under Com-
munism. This "economic law" was not, like bourgeois law, interested
in legal stability but in scientific progress, "changing constantly as the
100. See Dobrin, Soviet Jurisprudence and Socialism, 52 LAW Q. REv. 402 (1936).101. Pashukanis, supra note 94, at 137. See also the statement by Ginsberg, in 1927,
as quoted by Dobrin, supra note 100, at 419: "The existence of a single owner and of a
single organizer excludes private law and law in general."
102. Pashukanis, supra note 94, at 178.
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conditions change"' 03 comparable rather to railway regulations or rules
for medical treatment than to law in the traditional sense. As Pashu-
kanis wrote in 1930:
[W] e need the utmost elasticity in our legislation. 'We cannot tie
ourselves to any system because we are every day breaking up the
economic system. Policy is law; we have a system of proletarian
politics, but we do not have a system of proletarian law. 04
East German jurists after Babelsberg did not share this legal nihilism.
Their "economic law" was dearly law in the traditional sense; they
simply favored administrative law over civil law methods. Barely inter-
ested in questions of economic expediency, they looked at their eco-
nomic law from an abstract legal point of view, mainly concerned with
the structure of authority in a planned economy and with the legal
and ideological niceties of the relationship between the plan and dif-
ferent types of contracts. The "legal" nature of economic law was never
denied, and no reference appears to have been made to Pashukanis
or his followers during this period. Like their civil law colleagues,
East German economic law scholars viewed their discipline as a new
type of socialist law and saw no contradiction between the words "so-
cialist" and "law." Economic law, like all law, was to be an instrument
of the state, not allowed to wither away but to be strengthened in the
interest of the transformation of society.
Despite superficial similarities, then, East German legal theory after
the Babelsberg conference had little in common with the Soviet juris-
prudence of the NEP period. The differences in outlook can be ex-
plained at least in part by a lack of knowledge of Marxist theory among
East German jurists; no East German was ever able to handle Marx's
writings with the intellectual dexterity of a Pashukanis. But the chief
explanation for Soviet legal nihilism on the one hand and East German
faith in law on the other probably lies in the different historical con-
texts: the eschatological hopes still vivid in the Soviet Union of the
twenties and early thirties could not very well be shared by East Ger-
mans of the late fifties.
3. The Stalinist Period
After 1936 these hopes were not shared by the political leadership of
the Soviet Union either. In 1936, Stalin announced the end of the
period of socialist reconstruction and the beginning of socialism. A
103. Id.
104. Quoted by V. Gsovsr, supra note 79, at 186.
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new constitution was adopted in the same year. The Soviet Union
needed, in Stalin's words, "stability of laws now more than ever."'u0
A legal philosophy which denied the possibility of socialist law was
incompatible with the political aim of consolidating Soviet society. On
April 27, 1938, Vyshinsky, Prosecutor of the USSR, announced new
guidelines for jurisprudence at the First Congress on Problems of the
Sciences of Soviet State and Law in Moscow. He severely criticized the
legal positions of the preceding years, denouncing Pashukanis in partic-
ular as a "traitor" and "wrecker." NEP jurisprudence in general was
criticized for its lack of political usefulness: "The trend of our science
of law has not been in accord with the interests of the cause of socialist
building . . . ,"06--that is, for Vyshinsky, with the interests of the
Soviet state. Advancing these interests would now be the main task
of Soviet legal science under Stalin: "to strengthen the soviet state and
soviet law in every possible way."' 0T
The thesis of Vyshinsky's 1938 speech was just the opposite of Pashu-
kanis's: not only could there be socialist law, but law under socialism
would be "elevated ... to the highest state of its development. Only in
socialist society does law acquire a firm ground for its development."u 08
Since a good deal of Soviet law at least closely resembled bourgeois law
-not only the Civil Code of 1922, but large parts of the new Stalinist
constitution as well-this thesis needed explanation. Vyshinsky de-
fended it with the same arguments East German jurists later used
before the Babelsberg conference to rehabilitate the BGB for their
purposes: the thesis of bourgeois form and socialist content deriving
from the assertion that the character of law was determined by the
character of the society using it.
The form and content argument had already been held against
Pashukanis in 1937 in an article by a relatively unknown jurist named
Yudin, who is supposed to have written his attack on higher orders. 109
Yudin declared that "the content itself defines the form"' 0 and, having
thus got rid of the problem of bourgeois legal forms, that the content
in turn was defined by political circumstances: "From bourgeois law,
socialist law is distinguished as having socialist production relations as
105. Quoted by Hazard in his introduction to Sov=T LEGAL THEORY, supra note 83,
at xxxii.
106. Vyshinsky, The Fundamental Tasks of the Science of the Soviet Socialist Law,
in Sovir LEGAL PHILosOPHY, supra note 92, at 303.
107. Id. 332.
108. Id. 328.
109. Hazard, supra note 99, at xxix.
110. Yudin, supra note 92, at 294ff.
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its content and its form."' 11 Vyshinsky argued the same way: "Law, or
the legal superstructure, can and must be explained in the last analysis
out of the economic structure of society, out of its relationships of pro-
duction." 112 Since Soviet law, based on socialist production relation-
ships, thus necessarily had to be socialist law, it could absorb elements
of formerly bourgeois law without losing its socialist character:
[W]hatever has been created by centuries of judicial culture in
the field of legal form, Soviet socialist law examines, develops, and
enriches, but rejects absolutely all that is foreign to the new so-
ciety.113
With this justification for the presence of seemingly bourgeois ele-
ments in Soviet socialist law, even patently traditional codes like the
Civil Code of 1922 became respectable, not just as temporarily useful
bourgeois law (as the NEP jurists had argued) but as socialist law.
Despite the anti-individualistic political atmosphere of the Stalinist
era, civil law attained a certain degree of stability.114 The abolition of
the private enterprise sector of the NEP economy greatly diminished
the field governed by civil law, but the Civil Code regained some of its
importance through the conversion of Arbitrazh (the settlings of dis-
putes within the state-owned economy) from a purely administrative
into an adjudicative procedure. The State Board of Arbitration
(Gosarbitrazh), which under the influence of "economic law" theory
had been intended to be an administrative agency basing its decisions
not on civil law but on economic policy and expediency, was converted
by the mid-thirties into what amounted to a commercial court. Adher-
ing to the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, it treated disputes aris-
ing out of planned contract relationships between state enterprises as
civil law conflicts governed by the provisions of the Civil Code and
other Soviet laws.115 Former contentions that only courts should con-
sider themselves bound by law were rejected as "clearly untrue":
It is proper definitely to condemn and to punish those arbiters
who imagine that an arbitrational decision may go contrary to
law because a decision not corresponding to law is "economically
convenient." Gosarbitrazh does not have the right to depart from
law even by one step .... 1 6
111. Id. 295.
112. THE LAW oF Tmn SovET STATE 57 (A. Vyshinsky ed., H. IV. Babb transl. 1948).
113. A. VYSHINSKY & Al. lKmVA, SovIET SocLAuisr LAw 3 (Univ. of Texas transl. 1950).
114. Westen, supra note 88, at 35.
115. H. BansdAN, supra note 91, at 64.
116. Id. 66.
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Although introduced not out of respect for the principle of due
process but for purely instrumental reasons,117 this new stress on so-
cialist legality had a conservative effect on civil law. This was true not
only with regard to the legal position of state enterprises but-at least
in theory-with regard to the rights of the individual as well. Accord-
ing to Vyshinsky:
Socialist law gives great attention to the preservation of personal
and property interests of citizens, to private property, and to
strengthening the guarantees of individual liberty, that is, the invio-
lability of person and home, and of secrecy of communication,118
The Stalinist constitution of 1936 contained a whole catalogue of civil
rights, including rights of property and inheritance. During the forties
these rights were further expanded, by abolition of the inheritance
tax in 1943, enlargement of the circle of legal and testamentary heirs
in 1945, and permission to construct private housing under certain
conditions in 1948.119 Although during all these years they were in
practice exposed to political interference, civil law rights under Stalin
were, at least in legal theory, respected and interpreted in traditional
fashion. Vyshinsky's socialist civil law was basically the civil law of the
NEP period, deprived of both its bourgeois unrespectability and some
of its bourgeois security. All Vyshinsky added was a certain normativ-
ism 120 (later criticizedl') and a strong emphasis on the coercive func-
tions of the state. But although these features are symptomatic of the
political vulnerability of civil law positions in this period, Soviet legal
doctrine under Vyshinsky's leadership never produced anything close
to the East German preoccupation after Babelsberg with introducing
the state into formerly private law,
Soviet civil law theory from 1938 to the Twentieth Party Congress
in 1956 is rather comparable to East German doctrine between 1952
and 1958, the pre-Babelsberg period. Similar political problems (con-
solidation of a socialist state under conditions of inner instability and
117. Cf. Mozheik & Shkundin: "The defense of the intqrcst of the state, of sociallst
ownership, is achieved by means of the defense of individual enterprises and orgalizatlons
representing that ownership." Quoted in id. 66.
118. A. VYSHINSKY & M. KAREVA, supra note 112, at 9.
119. Westen, supra note 88, at 36.
120. Vyshinsky's definition of law as an aggregate of rules expressing the will of the
dominant class granted weight to law only as an objective body of norms authorized by
the state and left out the legal significance of individual initiative expressed in juridical
relationships. See Vyshinsky's definition in Vyshinsky, The Fundamental Tashs of the
Science of Soviet Socialist Law, in SOVIEr LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 94, at 303, 836.
See also Bilinsky, Zur Problematik des subjektiven Rechts in der sowjetischen Rechtslehre,
1 JAHRBUCH FUR OsrREmcrT pt. 2, at 137, 148, 151 (1960).
121. See p. 31 inlra.
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Outer hostility) produced similar legal solutions (utilization of tradi-
tional law labelled socialist law) similarly rationalized (new production
relationships infuse bourgeois laws with socialist content). But it was
precisely this position from which East German civil law theorists after
Babelsberg were trying to escape. Except for a certain hostility towards
individual rights-expressed largely in political terms under Vyshinsky
and in theoretical concepts by the Babelsberg version of socialist civil
law-there are no direct parallels between pre-Stalinist and Stalinist
Soviet legal history and the East German developments of the Babels-
berg period.
4. After Stalin
Since the Stalinist period of civil law in the Soviet Union was already
over by the time the Babelsberg tenets were being developed, even a
common hostility towards the individual could no longer support East
German doctrines. Shortly before the Twentieth Party Congress in
February 1956, the individual's position with respect to civil law had
become a new object of discussion in the Soviet Union. The debate
centered in particular around the nature of the juridical relationship
and the origin of subjective rights, 21- Vyshinsky's definition of law,
which included only the body of norms sanctioned by the state and
regarded juridical relationships as mere emanations from these norms,
was now attacked as one-sided and rigid. According to this definition,
it was said, legal relationships came into being only because some
norm provided for and regulated their existence. Vyshinsky's concept of
law thus attributed to norms "magical qualities of omnipotence"12
and overlooked the fact that norms are realized through the actions of
people and thus through juridical relationships. Furthermore, Vyshin-
sky was accused of disregarding the subjective rights originating in
juridical relationships.124
The new doctrine, therefore, incorporated the juridical relationship
into the definition of law as "the legal norm in its realization."1-5 This
abstract proposition was of more than theoretical importance since it
reflected a new emphasis on the role of individual initiative in civil
122. Bilinsky, supra note 120, at 150.
123. Stalgewitsch, Einige Fragen der Theorie der sotialistischen RechtsverhItnisse,
transl. from the Russian in 6 Rechtswissenschaftlicher Informationsdienst col. 583, at col.
587 (1957) [hereinafter cited as RID],124. Piontkowski, Einige Fragen der aligemeinen Theorie des Staates und des Rechts,
transil. from the Russian in 5 RID col. 183, at col. 189 (1956).
125. Id. at col. 187; Ketschekjan, Rechtsnormen und Rechtsverllltnisse, trans. from
the Russian in 5 RID col. 197, at col. 198 (1956).
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law relationships, particularly in the area of contracts. It accompanied
the awakened interest in the individual and his rights after Stalin's
death,126 an interest shared even by those jurists who rejected the
recently broadened definition of law.
127
Thus at the same time that the East Germans were attacking the
concepts of subjective right and contract, interest in these concepts
was growing in the Soviet Union. The liberalization and new waves of
activity inaugurated by the Twentieth Party Congress eventually led
to the long-planned enactment of new civil law: the Fundamentals of
Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, begun in 1957
and first published in draft form in 1960. The Fundamentals ran
counter to virtually every civil law tenet developed in East Germany
in the years after Babelsberg. In particular, they perpetuated the tradi-
tional distinction between civil law and administrative law on the basis
of co-ordination versus subordination, 128 thus rejecting the East Ger-
man concept of a special branch of economic law comprising all legal
relationships in the field of the state economy, vertical as well as
horizontal.
This conceptual problem, however, was settled only after a long and
sharp dispute which provides the only instance in which East German
jurists of the Babelsberg period and a number of their Soviet col-
leagues agreed. This time the Soviet debate over economic law did not,
as during the late twenties and early thirties, concern the question of
legal versus technical norms. Although the early economic law theorists
were commended for having directed attention to the special problems
associated with relationships within the state-owned economy,120 their
accompanying legal nihilism was plainly rejected.130 After the Twen-
tieth Party Congress in 1956, when the pre-Stalinist taboos on legal
126. E.g., Joffe, Der zivilrechtliche Schutz der Interessen der Person in der UdSSR,
transl. from the Russian in 5 RID col. 507 (1956). Joffe also demanded civil law protection
for hitherto unprotected subjective rights of a non-property variety, such as honor and
dignity. Id. at col. 517.
127. See, e.g., Farber, Ober den Begriff des Rechts, transl. from the Russian in 6 RID
col. 217, at col. 222 (1957). Farber rejected particularly Piontkowski's theses, but agreed
with Piontkowski in criticizing the "totally insufficient" treatment of subjective rights In
Soviet legal doctrine. SoviEr CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PROcEDuRE 58 (S. Bratus, E. Fleishits
& R. Khalfina eds. 1962).
128. Cf. Article 2.
129. Pawlow, Die Diskussionen fiber das System des sozialistischen Sowjetrechts, 8
STAAT u. R. 627, 639 (1959); Tadewosjan, Zu einigen Fragen des Systems des Sow jetrechts,
transl. from the Russian in 6 RID col. 13, at cal. 15 (1957).
130. Although a defender of economic law, Pawlow in this respect approved the
outcome of the debates introducing the Vyshinsky era: "One of the main posltive results
of the scientific discussion [from 1938 to 1940] . . . consisted in the refutation of all
objections against the construction of a system of socialist Soviet law." Pawlow, supra
note 129, at 628.
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debates were lifted and the second economic law discussion began,
Tadewosjan wrote:
The question is not whether to restore the science of economic law
to the form it had before the acceptance of the constitution of
the USSR in 1936, with all the erroneous theses which in that
period were advanced by its supporters. The aim is rather to create
a correct conception of this branch of law which actually exists
within the system of Soviet law.131
Thus even its defenders did not see economic law as a qualitatively
new kind of law, but as one branch beside others.
Unlike the pre-Stalinist days, the dispute this time did not concern
the role of law in Communist dogma, but the best way of organizing
the Soviet economy. On one side were those who advocated improving
the quality of planning through more efficient administrative control
over the individual enterprise's economic performance; on the other
those who would place greater reliance on economic initiative from
below by establishing a system of material incentives and safeguarding
and enlarging the individual enterprise's economic rights and respon-
sibilities. The Soviet "economists," pointing to the interdependence
between plan and contract, favored the first approach and insisted on
an economic law which would combine vertical and horizontal modes
of economic organization of state enterprises, assuring the predom-
inance of the plan over contractual relationships. They emphasized
the need for complex legislation concerning both production and dis-
tribution and for specialized training and research in this field. The
"civilists," on the other hand, favored the second approach and pleaded
for a unified civil law that would embrace both the relationships be-
tween state enterprises and those between citizens. They stressed the
dose interdependence of exchange relationships at all levels and the
functional similarities between all types of contracts. Strict separation
of civil-law contract relationships and administrative planning should
protect the individual enterprise's civil law rights and obligations
(within the limits of the plan) from administrative interference.
The controversy was closely watched by theorists in East Germany
and in other Eastern European countries, who participated indirectly
in the dispute through the choice of Soviet articles appearing in their
journals. The East Germans favored pro-economic law articles; the
Poles, for instance, the civilist ones. 3 2 At a conference of the Law
131. Tadewosjan, supra note 129, at col. 15.
132. Bilinsky, Ringen um das Zivilrecht iin Ostblock, 7 OsEuRoPA.RrEarr 174. 179(1967).
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Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1958, to which rep-
resentatives of other socialist countries were invited, a majority of the
Soviet participants, supported only by the East German delegates,
advocated a special economic law.'3 But although a second conference
held in May 1959 without foreign delegates came out even more
strongly in favor of economic law, 3 4 the economists were finally over-
ruled after the personal intervention of Kosygin, who preferred the
civilist arguments.135 With the publication of the draft of the Funda-
mentals in July 1960, the question seemed to be settled, In his presenta-
tion of the final draft, Poljansky, chairman of the legislative commis-
sion of the Soviet of the Union, referred to the practical economic
motives for accepting the civilist solution, particularly to the "actively
organizing role of contracts" in the Soviet economy. 180 Similar reasons
were explicitly stated in the Fundamentals' preamble:
Full use in Communist construction is being made of commodity-
money relations in keeping with their new content under the
planned socialist economy, and use is also made of such important
instruments Of economic development as khozraschyot [economic
accountancy 37], money, price, cost, profit, trade, credit, and finance.
Communist construction is based on the principle of material
incentives for citizens, enterprises, kolkhozes, and other economic
organisations [sic].8
The civllists appeared to have won in the Soviet Union.
The East Germans at first showed no inclination to side with the
winners. Their ideological investment in the Babelsberg economic law
theory was too great to be given up easily. Even when Russians and
East Germans were still in agreement on the existence of economic
law, German doctrine was much more fundamentalist than its Soviet
counterpart. Weichelt, for instance, reporting on the conference of the
USSR Academy of Sciences in 1958, which came out in favor of eco.
nomic law, nevertheless noted critically:
Nearly all contributions to the discussion took as their point of
departure the established categories and the conceptual system of
133. Weichelt, Wissenschaftliche Konjerenz zu Fragets des sotialistischen Rechtasystoens
und der sozialistischen Gesetzlichkeit in der Sowietunion, 7 STmT U. R. 849 (1958); 13iln-
sky, supra note 132.
134. Pawlow, Zur Kodifikation der sowietischen Zivilgesetzgebung, trarlsl, from the
Russian in 8 kID cot. 481, at col. 482 (1959); Bilinsky, supra note 132.
135. Hazard, Has the Soviet State a New Function? 94 TtIE POL. Q. 391, 895-96 (1903).
136. Poljanski, Zum Entwurf der Grundlagen flr die Zivilgesetzgebung der UdSSR
und der Unionsrepubliken, 11 STAT u. R. 350, 351 (1962).
137. See supra note 64.
138. SovIET CIVIL LEISLATION AND PROcEDUP 56 (S. BratuS, E. Fleishits 9, R. Khalfina
eds. 1962).
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the existing legal framework. They thus could not come close to
the problem of economic law, which on the contrary is excludedby the existing system of categories and concepts,130
To the East Germans, the theory of a separate economic law was pri-
marily a matter of ideological concern; it was their most important
evidence for the claim that the bourgeois legal heritage had been
successfully discarded. To reject this theory and to return to the tradi-
tional notion of a comprehensive civil law would amount to the
renunciation of all efforts made since Babelsberg to create a new socialist
legal system. The East Germans hesitated to do this as long as possible.
Although a German translation of the Soviet draft was already pub-
lished in September 1960,140 the first East German article dealing ex-
tensively with the Soviet conception of civil law did not appear until
July 1962,141 nearly two years later. As late as August 1961, an eco-
nomic law conference recommended legislation of a special economic
code.142
Throughout 1961, however, resistance to the Soviet influence among
East German jurists progressively weakened, particularly among civil
law scholars. On December 8, 1961, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
ratified the final draft of the Fundamentals. A week later, a civil law
conference in the GDR Ministry of Justice called the Soviet example
an "invaluable aid" to work on the East German civil code and de-
manded a "clear decision" as to which relationships between state-
owned enterprises should be included in it.'43 From then on, the tenets
developed following the Babelsberg conference were gradually dis-
avowed; the most radical period of East German civil law was over.
IV. 1961 to the Present: Civil Law and Economic Reforms
East German civil law development since the ratification of the
Soviet Fundamentals has been influenced not only by the legal tenets
of that codification but also, though somewhat less directly, by Soviet
economic doctrines and developments. While the Fundamentals caused
a retreat from the radical Babelsberg theories to more conservative
139. Weichelt, supra note 133, at 852.
140. 9 STAAT u. R. 1563 (1960) (German translation).141. Artzt, Zur Frage eines selbstdndigen Rechtszweiges "Recht der sozialistischenWirtschaft" in der DDR, 11 STAAT u. R. 1369 (1962).142. Conference of Aug. 4, 1961, reported in 10 STAAT u. R. 1981 (1961).143. Pdischel & KrFager, Erste Auswertung des XXII. Parteitages der KPdSU und des140 Plenums des Zentralkomitees der SED ffir die Schtaffung des neuen ZGB und der
zeuen ZPO, 16 NJ 111, 115 (1962).
The Yale Law Journal
doctrines, the Liberman economic debate in the Soviet Union helped
precipitate the recent economic reforms in the GDR, which have not
only surpassed their Soviet counterparts, but also to some extent modi-
fied the conservative influence of the Fundamentals on East German
legal thought. Before investigating their effect on East German civil
law doctrine, these two sources of influence should be examined in
some detail.
A. The Soviet Fundamentals
Even apart from their rejection of a separate economic law, the
Fundamentals are basically conservative. East German jurists initially
went so far as to accuse them of "preserving bourgeois elements,"
14
a reproach which was not difficult to justify. Like bourgeois civil codes,
the Fundamentals are structured around the concepts of property and
contract, and treat both in the Western European legal tradition.
Property is defined, conventionally enough, by the trichotomy of
possession, use, and disposal (Article 19). The code comprehends all
kinds of property, from state property down to personal property,
thus lumping together types of ownership which the East Germans
sought to treat in two separate branches of law. The area of subjective
rights in general is enlarged. The right of inheritance is completely
restored by allowing testaments in favor of persons other than legal
heirs (Article 119 1). In contrast to the NEP code, which furnished
rules only for the protection of rights of ownership, the Fundamentals
introduce the protection of possession without ownership (Article 29).
Finally, they extend civil law protection to the non-property rights of
honor and dignity (Article 7, a provision which was lacking in the
original draft), although not by granting financial damages but through
the establishment of a right to obtain retraction. The main "socialist"
feature of the Fundamentals is an emphasis on the consumption func-
tion of personal property, embodied particularly in the rule that "per-
sonal property of citizens may not be used to derive unearned income"
(Article 25 I). This provision was added to the draft only after this
feature of socialist personal property had been emphasized in the pub-
lic discussion.145
The treatment of contracts in the new code is equally conservative.
144. Reported by Dornberger, Fiedler, Schubert & Winkler, Zu den gesellschajtlichen
Grundlagen und Aufgaben des einheitlichen Zivilrechts in der DDR, 12 STAAT. U. R. 137,
144 (1963).
145. Hastrich, Das persdnliche Eigentum des Sowjetbilrgers in der Obergangszeit zurn
Kommunismus, 9 OSrEuROPA-REcHT 26, 28 (1963).
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The fact that the Fundamentals include both contracts between citi-
zens and contracts between state enterprises, in spite of the influence of
planning on the latter, has already been mentioned. The legal defini-
tion of an obligation (Article 33 I), which closely resembles the analo-
gous provision in the BGB, 1. is also indicative. Furthermore, the final
version of the Fundamentals, unlike the draft, introduces a traditional
legal definition of contracts (Article 34 1), and names contracts as the first
cause of legal obligation (Article 33 II). More important, the Funda-
mentals state that civil rights and duties arise "from transactions pro-
vided by law, and also from transactions which, while not provided by
law, do not contradict it" (Article 4 II), thus to a certain extent recog-
nizing the civil law principle of private autonomy. Finally it is pro-
vided that legal capacity is automatically acquired by birth (Article 8
I), not "granted," as in Section 4 of the NEP code, in the interest of
the state.
On the whole, then, the Fundamentals follow the Western private
law model. 47 Their civil law is the traditional law of property and
exchange relationships in which the state, through its enterprises, plays
the role of a privileged' 48 civil law partner. No mention is made of
separate regulation of production and consumption relations, of a
"general juridic relationship," or of the influence of socialist collectives
on civil law rights as in the East German proposals after Babelsberg.
B. Soviet Economic Reforms
The economic proposals brought to public attention in the Liber-
man discussions of September 1962 had already been debated in the
Soviet Union for a number of years; some reflections of these debates
can even be found in the Fundamentals, particularly their preamble.
Liberman's demands for more freedom of decision for the individual
enterprise, fewer plan targets and more contracts, and a relation of
premiums' 49 to profit instead of output were not entirely new.100 But
the publication of the Liberman discussions in Pravda seemed to imply
official approval, if not of Liberman's tenets at least of the discussion
itself and thus for the first time gave liberalizing economic proposals
the appearance of socialist respectability.
146. Cf. BGB § 241.
147. "The new Soviet civil law remains definitely conservative in character."' Westen,
The New Codes of Civil Law, 14 PROBLEMS OF CONIMUNf 34, 41 (1965).148. No bona fide purchase of state property, Art. 28 IV, and no application of the
statute of limitations to certain of the state's daims. Art. 17.149. Premiums are monetary rewards given to individuals or collectives for superior
economic performance.
150. Nove, The Liberman Proposals, 4 SuRvEY 112 (1963).
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The Liberman discussions were published at a time when East
Germany's economic situation looked particularly bleak. Besides the
usual problems of socialist planned economies, East Germany had spe-
cial troubles with its labor shortage (the emigration of thousands of
skilled workers was stopped by the Berlin wall only in 1961) and, after
Czechoslovakia, the lowest growth rate in the Eastern Bloc, dropping
from 12.8 per cent in 1959 to 4.9 per cent in 1963.15, The Seven-Year
Plan of 1959 fell so far behind schedule that it had to be replaced by
the Seven-Year Plan of 1964, with considerably reduced targets.
Obviously reform was necessary-a conclusion which, if not directly
encouraged by the Liberman discussions, could at least be justified by
pointing to the Soviet debate. At the seventeenth session of the Central
Committee in October 1962, only a month after the publication of
Liberman's proposals in the Soviet Union, Ulbricht referred to the
"very interesting discussion" among Soviet economists and suggested
changes in the system of incentives as well as in the "petty patronizing"
of individual enterprises in East Germany.5 2 At the Sixth Party Con-
gress in January 1963, he repeated his demand for economic reform in
stronger terms, announcing as one of the first and most important steps
the transformation of the associations of state-owned enterprises
(Vereinigungen Volkseigener Betriebe-VVB) from administrative into
economic organizations. The final reform, the "New Economic System
of Planning and Guiding of the National Economy," proposed by a
joint Conference of the Central Committee and the Council of Minis-
ters in June, was ratified on July 11, 1963. Besides the changes in the
VVB, it contained many proposals to be found in all programs of
economic reform adopted in East Europe in the next few years: reduc-
tion of plan targets, expansion of the authority of individual enter-
prises, strengthening of the system of economic incentives and their
relation to economic performance measured by profits, promotion of
contracts between economic units. 15 3 In December 1965, the New Eco-
nomic System was further elaborated by a new method of planning
introduced at the eleventh session of the Central Committee: a system
of partial planning from below, according to which individual enter-
prises and their associations (on the basis of fewer general plan
targets than before) conclude economic contracts amongst each other,
151. Miller & Trend, Economic Reforms in East Germany, 15 PROBLMS os' CoIMiu-
Nism 29, 30 (1966).
152. Quoted in Neues Deutschland, Oct, 14, 1962, at 4 (Berlin edition).
153. Miller & Trend, supra note 151; Grossman, Economic Reforms: A Balance Sheet,
15 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISm 43 (1966).
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which then in turn (subject to their approval from above) are to be in-
corporated into the central plan, thus helping with its preparation.,
In the Soviet Union, economic reform came later than in East Ger-
many. The Liberman proposals were originally rejected in Khru-
shchev's reforms of November 1962, which tried to strengthen instead
of weaken party control over the economy by organizing the party into
an industrial and an agricultural branch. Under the new leadership
after Khrushchev, economic reform was finally introduced in Septem-
ber 1965. It is the least daring of all recent Soviet bloc reforms, retain-
ing most physical production targets and the rigid system of material
allocation. 155 Reliance on horizontal cooperation between individual
enterprises seems to play a lesser role than in East Germany. Branch
associations like the East German VVB, which could replace much of
the centralized planning through contractual coordination, are only
now being experimentally introduced in the Soviet Union,15 0 and the
utilization of contracts in the preparation of the plan seems to be
much more limited than in the GDR,
C. Effects on Civil Law Doctrine
As we have seen, once the Soviet Fundamentals were ratified, East
German jurists quickly began to re-examine and renounce their former
positions. In July 1962, the civil law legislative commission decided to
follow the Soviet example and to include contractual relationships
within the state economy in the new code.157 This return to traditional
civil law was confirmed a year later by the New Economic System,
which in checking the influence of the bureaucracy and encouraging
the initiative of individual enterprises also switched from administra-
tive to civil law methods, particularly contracts.
By 1963, traditional concepts like contract and subjective right had
been largely rehabilitated. Since in a system of economic incentives
the protection of the individual's rights is particularly important, all
former criticism of the concept of subjective right was disavowed:
Only if we stop associating notions like right, obligation, claim
154. See Speech of Walter Ulbricht at the eleventh session of the Central Committee
of the SED, Dec. 15-18, 1965, in W. ULBRITcrr, ZuNI NEUEN &ONOMISCHEN SYSTEM DER
PLANUNG uNTD LErEUNG 663, 692 (1966).
155. Grossman, supra note 153, at 50.
156. Tantschuk, Die Rechtsformen der wirtschaftlichen Rechnungsfilhrung in der
Sowjetunion, 11 VS 500 (1967).
157. See Fur ein einheitliches Zivilrecht: Bericht ilber die Hallemer Tagung yom
4. 10. 1962, 16 NJ 667, 669 (1962).
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etc.... automatically with isolation, egotism, etc., will we be able
to create a new law corresponding to social necessities.
1 8
Civil law was no longer regarded primarily as a means of poltical edu-
cation and indoctrination as it had been after Babelsberg, but was
simply to protect certain rights and obligations. In Ulbricht's words at
the Sixth Party Congress:
One should not believe that it is possible to overcome by appeals
to morals and ideological consciousness those shortcomings which
are caused by a faulty attitude towards the material interests of
our citizens.'r0
And translated into new civil law:
Educating citizens to respect socialist legality and completely pro-
tecting their property rights and other rights are two sides of one
and the same thing.160
In contract law, the Babelsberg concept of the "general juridical rela-
tionship" was attacked as artificial and impractical. Contracts were
again recognized as the most efficient method of coordinating interests
and were defined in the traditional fashion. In keeping with the Soviet
discussion about the nature of the juridical relationship, civil law
norms were seen not as the direct source of rights and obligations but
only as guidelines. The fact that these guidelines had to be realized
through the actions of citizens led the East German jurists to rediscover
the principles of freedom of contract "under socialist conditions,"'01
in accordance with Article 4 of the Fundamentals.
On the whole, then, the combined influence of the Fundamentals
and the new economic reform led to a renaissance of traditional civil
legal thinking in East Germany. In the course of the years, however,
the implementation of the New Economic System again caused a de-
parture from conventional doctrine. Originally it had been assumed
that the new economic reform, with its stress on contracts at the ex-
pense of administrative directives, required a traditional civil law
system patterned after the Soviet model, which would comprehend
158. Grandke, Einige Fragen der Weiterfilhrung des Grundrechts der Bilrger aul
Mitwirkung bei der Leitung und Gestaltung des gesellschajtlichen Lebens dutrch das
Zivilrecht, 11 STAAT u. R. 306, 311 (1962).
159. 1 PROTOKOLL DES VI. PARTEITAGS DER SED 100 (Berlin, 1963).
160. Bley, Ober die rechtliche Schadenszufilgung und die ausservertragliche zivilrecht-
liche Verantwortlichkeit bei der Schadensverhiltung und beim Schadensausgleich, In PRon-
LEME DES SOZIALISTISCHEN ZIVILRECHTS (Deutsche Akademie filr Staats. und Rechtswissen-
schaft "Walter Ulbricht" Sektion Zivilrecht ed.) 224, 228 (1963).
161. Drews, PMischel & Schumann, Einige Schiussfolgerungen aus dem 17. Plenum des
ZK der SED flr die Zivilgesetzgebung, 12 STAAT u. R. 153, 155 (1963).
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contract relationships both between citizens and between state enter-
prises and would treat the economic relationships between these enter-
prises as a matter of individual cooperation rather than subordination
under administrative authorities. During the first years under the new
system, however, it became obvious that economic reform could not
wait for the enactment of the new code (which, after all, was already
overdue by several years). In February 1965, therefore, a new version
of the Contract Law (Vertragsgesetz) of 1957 was enacted to regulate
contract relations in the state-owned economy. 102 Although still gen-
erally viewed as a civil-law lex specialis, the new law encouraged the
"economists" among the East German jurists to proclaim once again
the necessity of a special branch of "economic law." As after Babelsberg,
they based their arguments on the close connection between plan and
contract within the state-run economy and argued that the interde-
pendence of economic contracts and the central plan did not permit
their being lumped together with contracts between citizens.
Since 1965 this new economic law theory has been gaining ground;
it is at present the prevailing doctrine. In 1966, chairs for economic
law were created in East German law schools; at the Seventh Party
Congress in April 1967 Ulbricht seems to have settled the question by
asking for "thoroughly developed economic law."'u At first glance,
East Germany would seem to have returned to its position after the
Babelsberg conference.
There are decisive differences, however. For one thing, what is left
of East German civil law proper no longer contains any of the radical
features of the Babelsberg period but remains, although deprived of a
large area of application, as conventional as its Soviet model. The new
economic law doctrine, furthermore, is much more liberal than its
Babelsberg predecessor. As critical of administrative interference with
economic decision-making as the "civilists," the "economists" reason
with pragmatic rather than dogmatic arguments. They do not insist on
a special economic code (at least not at present)104 but concentrate
instead on individual laws regulating particular complexes of economic
problems, such as the Decree of February 1967 on the legal position of
162. Law of Feb. 25, 1965, GB1 I, at 107.
163. Ulbricht, speech at the Seventh Party Congress, April 17-22, 1967, in W. Uraucirr,
ZUM 6KONOMISCHEN SYSrE DES SOzMAuSMUS IN DER DDR 182, 251 (1968).
164. With the establishment of the new doctrine of economic law, however. the first
demands for a general economic code are already appearing. Pflicke, Die Entwiddung
der Rechtsstellung der volkseigenen Produktionsbetriebe, 11 VS 724, 738 (1957); Pflicke,
Zur komplexen Entwicklung des Wirtsczaftsrechtsstemns, 17 STAAT u. R. 595, 600 (1968).
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state-owned enterprises. 05 Nor are they particular about an exact line
of demarcation between civil and economic law, as were the Babels-
berg economists. On the contrary, they are quite willing to draw on
the future civil code as far as general rules of contract and property
law are concerned. Compared to the doctrinaire and esoteric economic
law theory developed after the Babelsberg conference, the present dis-
cussions in economic law are lively, open, and unideological.
In the Soviet Union the present situation is somewhat comparable,
although the established position of the civilist Fundamentals and of
Republic codes based on their approach, seems to hinder discussion
more than in the GDR. In accordance with a decision of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, economic law is already taught in Soviet
universities; furthermore, a special section for economic law was created
in the Institute for State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences in
1965,166 On the other hand, the fact that certain Soviet "economists"
in 1967 still cite East German sources to support their theories'01
seems to indicate that the outcome of the dispute is not yet certain in
the USSR. At the end of 1966, on Soviet invitation, an East German
civil law delegation, headed by the GDR Vice-Minister of Justice,
discussed the question of civil versus economic law with leading officials
and jurists in Moscow. The Germans in this discussion represented
their compromise concept of civil law, that is, the Soviet concept
deprived however of the whole area of contract relations with the
state-owned economy. The cautiously phrased East German report on
this visit, 0 8 while mentioning specifically neither agreement nor dis-
agreement between Russians and Germans, suggests the latter,
However, the economic reforms which brought about the recent
revival of economic law theory in both East Germany and the Soviet
Union have also decreased the importance of the old controversy. The
decision of the Fundamentals for the civilist approach in 1960 still
reflected a political decision against excessive administrative inter-
ference and in favor of greater economic initiative from below. Since
the introduction of the economic reforms, however, these tenets have
been shared by the economists as well as the civilists, In fact, one can
even notice a certain reversal of positions. While the civilists were
165, Decree of Febrqary 9, 1967, GBI I, at 121,
166. Reported by Laptjew, Wissenschaitliche Probleme des Wirtsphaftsreclts, transl.
from the Russian in 9 VS 442, 445 (1965).
167. Laptjew, Rec)htsprobleme der Wirtschajtsrejorm, transl. from the Russian in
16 STAAT u. R. 1169, 1166 (1967).
168. Rane, Neues dkonomisches System t4nd aktrielle Probleme des Zjvilrechts, 91 NJ
201, 204 (1967).
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originally pragmatists, ready to use traditional civil law mechanisms in
the interest of economic efficiency, they now seem to have become some-
what rigid in their contention that civil law should embrace con-
tractual relationships between state enterprises as well as between
citizens, regardless of practical differences between the two types of
contracts and also, it appears, regardless of whether the civilists' orig-
inal aim--decentralization-would best be served by such an amalga-
mation. The economists, on the other hand, have in recent years quite
ingeniously attempted to defend the individual enterprise's position
against bureaucratic interference. In response to the civilist assertion
that only a strict legal separation of administrative and civil law can
insure the protection of contractual relationships from undue adminis-
trative intervention, Laptjew for instance has argued that on the con-
trary only an economic law can provide adequate safeguards: since
the source of trouble normally lies in the abuse of administrative au-
thority, civil law protection alone can be nothing more than a "civil
law illusion"; it must be replaced by more complex legal controls. 2 3
In East Germany, economic law scholars have even used the civil law
concept of the subjective right as a means of defending the individual
enterprise against the excessive influence of the state. In current de-
bates about the legal status of state enterprises, the East German
"economists" try to decentralize the concept of state property by ascrib-
ing to individual enterprises not just the "operative administration" of
given material and financial funds, but property-like rights of their
own: "subjective rights"'1 0 or "legitimate rights, to be legally protected,
whose attributes are based on objective conditions and not subject to
the state's 'arbitrary interventions.' ,,17
With these changes in economic law thinking, the outcome of the
current economic versus civil law controversy, both in the GDR (where
it seems to be at least temporarily decided) and in the Soviet Union
(where support for economic law is increasing), -72 has become far less
important than the practical success of the economic reforms, on which
the more or less liberal character of both economic and civil law theory
will eventually depend.
169. Laptjew, supra note 167, at 1169.
170. Heuer & Pfficke, Aulgaben des Wirtschaftsrechts und der lVirtschafisrechtswissen.
schaft bei der weiteren Gestaltung des neuen 6konomiscien systems, 11 VS 193, 195 (1957).
171. Hochbaum & Oberinder, Die Rechtsstellung des VEB, I0 VS 531, 535 (1966).
172. Laptjew, Rechtliche Aspekte der Wirtschaflsreform in der UdSSR. II VS 649.
654 (1967).
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D. Changes and Trends
The development of the economic law debate illustrates the influ-
ence which the new economic reforms have had on legal thinking in
both East Germany and the USSR. Most obvious is a new relaxation in
the style and tone of legal discussions. More fundamentally, the
changes in economic theory brought about a change in legal theory
as well, particularly in the assessment of how and how fast law would
wither away in the future. Finally, and going far beyond the area of
law, economic developments since 1963 seem to have stirred up a still
tentative and timid reappraisal of political dogma, which in legal
writings is reflected in a new interest in the relationship between law
and democracy.
1. The New Style of Legal Debate
In the last few years, the atmosphere of legal debate has changed
markedly. Economic pragmatism has led to a degree of legal pragma-
tism as well, and issues are gaining in importance at the expense of
dogma. In East German-Soviet relations, genuine legal discussions have
become possible, with participants taking positions quite independent
of national lines.'72 Especially in East Germany, where a brief and
unstable Communist past in combination with the constant confronta-
tion with its West German bourgeois counterpart had produced a
considerable need for dogmatic rigidity, a new openness of self-assured-
ness is visible. Concentration on economic utility instead of dogmatic
correctness has placed ideology more in the background; it is still the
basis of legal arguments, but no longer dictates every step. The at-
tempts made after Babelsberg to define economic law in terms of
democratic centralism, for instance, have been rejected with the remark
that "one cannot delineate the social complexes necessary for the
formation of a special branch of law with the help of a principle."'
'
"
It no longer seems necessary to find the one and only correct definition:
"Overlappings at the fringes [of a concept] are normal and in no way
alarming."'175 The attitude towards German legal traditions in particu-
173. At the East German conference on socialist economic management and law In
October 1967, for example, a dispute arose about the legal character of state enterprises.
While Bratus (USSR) and Heuer (GDR) emphasized the basic differences between state
enterprises and state organs in this discussion, Laptjew (USSR), Hochbaum (GDR) and
Friedrich (GDR) insisted on defining the state enterprise as the nucleus of the planning
apparatus of the state. See Langer, Bericht iiber die Diskussion in der Arbestsgrup
"Die Entwicklung der Rechtsstellung des sozialistischen Industriebetrebes," 11 VS 705,
756 (1967).
174. Artzt, Zur Frage eines selbstdndigen Rechtszweiges "Recht der sozialischen Wirt.
schaft" in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 11 STAAT u. R. 1560, 1368 (1962).
175. Pflicke, Die wirtschaftsrechtliche Orientierung ist fir die LMsung der klnftigen
Aulgaben notwendig, 10 VS 227, 229 (1966).
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lar has become more relaxed. In contrast to the studious avoidance of
private law terms characteristic of the Babelsberg period, it has become
possible to speak of "classical"' 170 or "time-tested"' 7 - bourgeois concepts
and to admit their usefulness openly:
One should not fail to recognize that new legislation correspond-
ing to the conditions of socialist society cannot be accompanied by
the negation of terms and concepts generally valid in legal sciences.
Certain "iconoclastic" tendencies from the first period of the de-
bate about the delineation of different branches of the law after
the Babelsberg conference .... It seemed natural.., to include
somewhat indiscriminately the traditional legal concepts and cate-
gories in the necessary controversy with bourgeois law. In the bat-
tie against formalism and positivism, however, several sham fights
have been fought, and without compelling reason new concepts
have been sought even where the traditional concepts reflected
processes which-although differentiated, with different nuances-
exist as well in our period. This has occasionally caused difficul-
ties of communication. The concepts "contract," "juridic person,"
"invalidity" and "liability" are not useless simply because they
have been used by bourgeois jurists.'-,
2. The Future of Law
The relaxed attitude towards bourgeois legal traditions is closely
related to another change: a new conception of the role of law under
socialism and Communism. Law at present is apparently seen neither
as a capitalist relic (as it was in the Soviet Union during the NEP years)
nor as an instrument of immediate ideological change (as in the GDR
after the Babelsberg Conference), but rather as a neutral phenomenon,
safeguarding and furthering political and economic conditions which
can in turn serve as the basis for political innovations. Although the
withering away of law has never ceased to be one of the predicted
features of the final stage of Communism, its demise seems to have been
postponed for the foreseeable future without much regret.
This attitude follows directly from the new emphasis on economic
decentralization and fits well into Pashukanis's analysis of law. Pashu-
kanis, it will be remembered, considered centralized planning and law
176. Niethammer, Der Streitcharakter des sozialistischen Zivilproesses. 12 STAAT U. R.
496, 504 (1963), referring to rules for the allocation of burden of proof.
177. Paischel, Grundsitze des khinhtigen Zivilverflahrens, 20 NJ 623, 627 (1966), referring
to the rule that civil law courts are bound by the claims raised by the parties.
178. Panzer 9- Penig, Vertragsgesetz und lVirtschaftsrecht, 15 STAAT U. R. 603. 614
n.40 (1966).
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to be mutually exclusive, since the "unity of purpose" within a central-
ized economy renders law-a means of coordinating conflicting interests
-unnecessary. With the increasing delegation of decision-making and
other functions from a central planning authority to relatively inde-
pendent economic units, however, the "unity of purpose" of which
Pashukanis had spoken was gradually displaced or supplemented by
competing interests of individual enterprises. 179 Law as a coordinating
mechanism thus became increasingly necessary.180 Heuer, for instance,
listed as the three most important tasks of East Germany's New
Economic System "the fight against railway-time-table ideas, against
the conception of the omniscience and omnipotence of superior au-
thorities"; "the fight against underrating the importance of economic
levers"; and finally, "the fight against underrating law."18l The three
tasks are links in a rational chain, with the emphasis on law a direct
result of growing misgivings about the practicability of exhaustive
planning.
Given this connection, Pashukanis had thought it necessary for
Marxists to decide against law and for central planning. In 1929 he
wrote:
He who refuses to admit that planning and organization are
incompatible with law is really convinced that the relations of
179. In East Germany this development is reflected in an Ideological reassessment of
the relationship between individual and societal interests, While during the Babelsberg
period the possibility of contradictions between interests of the individual and those of
the state was denied with the contention that both interests were merged into the In-
terests of the state, since the early sixties this equation has no longer been accepted. The
harmony of personal and collective interests under socialism today is seen not as an
automatic identity but as a harmony that must be created. Thus Ulbrtcht stated at the
Sixth Party Congress in 1963: "The task consists in bringing the personal interests of
the individual into harmony with the interests of society as a whole." 1 PAOToKOLL DER
VERHANDLUNGEN DES VI. PARTEITAGE DER SOZIALISTISCHEN EINNEITSPARTEI DEUTSUIILANDS
voM. 15. Bms 21. JANUAR 1963 192 (1963). The recent economic reforms In particular, are
based on the realization that in a planned economy of the old style the interests of In-
dividual enterprises can very well run counter to those of the economy as a whole, e.g.,
in cases of quantitative overfulfillment of the plan at the expense of quality. The New
Economic System thus can be seen as an attempt to coordinate possibly conflicting in-
terests in a more successful way, especially through an elaborate system of economic
incentives.
180. Heuer, Wissenschaftliche Wirtschaftsfilhrung und sozialistisches ReCht, 13 STAAT
U. R. 985, 996 (1964), seems to echo Pashukanis's theories:
There is only one system which can do without permanent definitions of areas of
responsibility: that is a consistently administrative system in which the whole economy
is considered and treated as a single factory, which works exclusively with plan
targets and directives.
Such a system is inflexible and rigid, it limits initiative and creativity and reduces
the efficiency of work . . . . Under our present conditions, however, the relative
autonomy of economic units and thus the expansion of their rights and obligations
must play a role of growing importance. Without the unequivocal definition of
rights and obligations formal administration cannot be overcome ..
181. Id. 996.
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capitalist economics are eternal and that their present eclipse is
merely a passing abnormality which will yet be removed.8 2
The social economists of the sixties, however, although probably not
convinced that the capitalist mode of exchange is "eternal," certainly
do not regard it as passing. In the USSR, the acceptance of the notion
of a socialist market is visible in a new evaluation of the NEP period,
which is no longer seen as a temporary "resurrection of capitalism"
(as Stalin had described it in 1933183), but as the "model of a socialist
economy"; while the direct exchange of products, once thought to be
the socialist rule, is now interpreted as a "temporary phenomenon.
introduced by extraordinary circumstances."18 4 The East Germans not
only agree with this assessment of the NEP period,""' but have applied
it to their present economic reforms as well, now characterizing what
was originally called the "New Economic System" as the "proper eco-
nomic system of socialism in the GDR."' 80 Commodity production is
now declared to be an "integral component of a socialist planned
economy."'187 At the fifth plenary session of the Central Committee in
February 1964, Ulbricht rebuked those "comrades who ... criticize the
present economic policy from the viewpoint of the future period of
completed Communism" and emphasized instead the tasks of the
present:
[We] do not discuss... whether the law of value will disappear in
30 or 50 years-we do everything to turn the consistent utilization
of the law of value... into a strong weapon in the economic fight
against imperialism.188
The acceptance of commodity production under socialism has been
further justified by Ulbricht's recent description of socialism as "not
a short-term transitional period," but a "relatively independent socio-
economic formation in the historical epoch of the transition from
capitalism to communism."'8 01 From this, it follows that
182. Quoted by Dobrin, supra note 100, at 420.
183. Quoted by V. Gsovsxz, supra note 79, at 23.
184. Kurizyn, Die Wirtschaftsreform in den Jahren 1921 bis 1923 und die revolutio.
ndre Gesetzlichkeit, transl. from the Russian in 16 SrAAT u. R. 778, 786 (1967).
185. Heuer, Entwickeltes gesellschaftliches System des Sozialtsmus und Wirlschaftsreclit,
11 VS 641, 642 (1967), characterized the New Economic Policy as "decisive progress
compared to all former achievements, both in theoretical and practical respects."
186. W. ULrnRICrr, Probleme des Perspekfivplanes bis 1970, in ZutM NEUEN oto - o!ns teN
SYSTE DER PLAoUNG uND LEIUNG 663, 668 (1966.
187. Heuer, supra note 185, at 643.
188. NV. ULBasclrr, DM DURCHFJHRUNG DER 6soNoMIsCHEN PoLrn IM PZ.ANJAM 1964
urN-, B.soNDnRnR BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER CHEMISCH.N INDUSTSHE (report on the fifth -ession
of the Central Committee of the SED from February 8 to 7, 1964) 27 (1964).
189. Quoted by Heuer, supra note 185, at 643.
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Socialist law is no more only transitional law than the socialist
economy is only a transitional economy, or the socialist society
only a transitional social order.10
Contrary to Pashukanis's aims, but in line with his analysis, the
rehabilitation of law proved to be particularly important in the area of
the economy, where the growing relative independence of individual
enterprises demanded an exact demarcation of their rights, responsi-
bilities, and areas of competence with respect to one another as well
as with respect to their superior authorities. 191 Both in the Soviet
Union and in East Germany, new decrees on the legal position of state
enterprises were enacted to broaden and safeguard such rights. 1 2 Al-
though the East German decree granted the enterprise a number of
rights against its superior authority (among others a right of compensa-
tion in certain cases of plan changes),' 93 it does not yet satisfy East Ger-
man economists. Pflicke has voiced hope that it will be "only a forerun-
ner" of a more extensive law still to be enacted which should expand
the legal weapons of individual enterprises against administrative inter-
ference.0 4 Heuer has extended the demand for "more law" to other
areas of the economy as well and suggested that not only the rules for
exchange relationships but also the principles guiding administrative
decisions should be legally fixed, thus introducing Rechtsstaat'95 no-
tions into socialist economic law. 90 It seems that far from withering
away, law under socialism very slowly emerges not only as an instru-
ment of the state for bringing about desired conditions, but also as a
means of controlling the state itself.
3. Law and Democracy
It would be surprising if the new importance attributed to law since
the economic reform in East Germany remained confined to the eco-
190. U.-J. HEUER, DEMOKRATIE UND RECHT 212 (1965).
191. Pflicke, Die Entwicklung der Rechtsstellung der volkseigenen Prod uktionsbetriebe,
11 VS 724, 726 (1967):
The allotment of areas of self-organization to individual enterprises . . renders
it necessary to grant these enterprises genuine subjective rights .... These rights
must be assured to them in vertical relationships of state regulation as well as In
horizontal relationships of cooperation.
192. For the Soviet decree of October 4, 1965, see Iwanow & Petrow, Die neue
Ordnung fiber den sozialistischen staatlichen Produktionsbetrieb, transl. from the Russian
in 15 STAAT u. R. 684 (1966). For the East German decree of February 9, 1967, GBl If,
at 121, see Pfilicke, supra note 191, at 727.
193. Section 17 of the decree of February 9, 1967, GBI II, at 121. The legal details
of this right to compensation are not specified but are left to be regulated by the
Council of Ministers.
194. Pflicke, supra note 191, at 727.
195. The term Rechtsstaat signifies the concept of a state subjected to the rule of law.
196. Heuer, Entwickeltes gesellschaftliches System des Sozialismus und Wirtschafls-
recht, 11 VS 707, 710 (1967).
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nomy alone. The new emphasis on subjective rights, for instance, al-
though intended to bolster the effectiveness of economic incentives,
inevitably means better protection of individual rights in general. The
revival of contracts, aimed at a more efficient utilization of personal
initiative in economic relationships, at the same time entails greater
respect for the autonomy of the individual. It is thus to be expected
that beyond its economic rehabilitation, law will become increasingly
important in other areas of social life as well.
In East Germany, a remarkable attempt to translate the new eco-
nomic functions of law into political terms was made by Heuer in 1965
in a book called Democracy and Law under the New Economic System.
Heuer extends the concept of competing economic interests to com-
peting political interests, and the notion of economic self-management
to political self-management. His analysis is largely based on (and to
some extent disguised in) cybernetic concepts. Cybernetics was officially
endorsed in the Soviet Union in 1961197 and soon after appeared in
East German legal argumentation.98 Heuer, however, applied cyber-
netics not only in a technical sense, to such matters as documentation
and legislative techniques, but in a much broader sociological sense as
well. As a parallel to the self-regulating process within a cybernetic
system and its subsystems, Heuer tried to explain the organization of
socialist society in terms of an interplay between society as a whole and
its self-organizing subsystems. He thus arrived at the problem of self-
regulation and self-management of individual social and economic
units within the society, which he considered to be vital for the efficient
functioning of the system as a whole. From there it was only a short
step to the question of democratic participation in the political sense:
"Self-organization in the social sphere finally and above all means self-
determination, individual or collective, of one's own affairs." 1 9 Law,
through the establishment of dearly defined individual rights and
duties and rules of conduct, has to further this process: "It is in partic-
ular the task of law to develop this self-organization."200
Heuer's book, although initially acclaimed in a journal for economic
law,20' was soon criticized for reducing the concept of democracy to
197. Kerschner, Cybernetics: Key to the Future? 14 PROBL IS OF Co.MUMasMI 56, 65
(1965).
198. Kannegiesser, Die Anwendung kybernelischer Methoden und Miittel in der
Rechtswissenschaft, 12 STAAT U. R. 786 (1963); Knapp, Ober die Maglichheit der An-
wendung kybernetischer Methoden im Recht, 12 STAAT u. R. 613 (1963).
199. U.-J. HEuER, supra note 190, at 180 (1965).
200. Id. 200.
201. See, e.g., Kreutzer, Book Review, i0 VS 183 (1966).
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self-determination and self-management, thus excluding from the defi-
nition of democracy the guiding role of the state.,202 In October 1966,
a special conference convened in the East German Academy of the
Sciences of State and Law to denounce Heuer's thesis and to determine
the correct approach to similar problems for the future.203 But contrary
to what would have happened only a few years earlier, official criticism
did not close the issue. At a conference on socialist economic manage-
ment and law, organized in October 1967 in honor of the fiftieth anni-
versary of the October revolution, Heuer reasserted his thesis:
If we look at socialist society, in cybernetic terms, as an extremely
complicated system with sub-systems existing at several levels; if
accordingly in these sub-systems processes of self-regulation and
self-determination take place; if human beings and human collec-
tives with the need for autonomous and creative activity ... are
involved, then an effective coordination of the system as a whole
with its sub-systems at different levels . . . is impossible without
socialist law. The stability of the system as a whole is impossible
without the stability of the sub-systems. 204
These theories were taken up by Pflicke 2 r and were apparently ap-
proved in the general discussion at the conference. 200
What interpretation do they warrant? It would be wrong, I think, to
construe theories like Heuer's simply as indirect attempts to return to
traditional bourgeois notions of law and democracy. In contrast to East
German civil law scholars before the late fifties, and probably to civil
law scholars of today, the East German "economists" do not seem to
share the legal values of West German jurists, despite common con-
cepts. Their attempts to break out of the ideological framework defined
by the Party should rather be seen as timid versions of Communist
reform theories; as attempts to humanize socialism, not to undermine
it. Heuer for instance says in his book:
[W]e must always realize that we as socialists fight for a new social
order not merely because it will bring with it a higher efficiency of
social productivity, but also because in this society and only in it
will man no longer be an enemy to man, but his friend, comrade,
202. Mollnau & Wippold, Kritische Anmerkungen zu einer Schrift iber Demokratie und
Recht im neuen 6konomischen System, 15 STAAT U. R. 1271, 1274 (1966).
203. See the report on this conference by Stiiber, Neues 6konomisches System und
soxialistische Demokratie, 16 STAAT U. R. 92 (1967).
204. Heuer, supra note 185, at 647.
205. Pificke, supra note 191, at 724.
206. Kreutzer, Bericht iber die Diskussion in der Arbeitsgruppe "Wissenschaftllch.
technischer Fortschitt und sozialistisches Recht" in der Wissenschaftlichen Konferenz
"Sozialistiche Wirtschaltsfilhrung und Recht," 11 VS 741, 754 (1967).
Vol. 78: 1, 1968
Civil Law in East Germany
and brother; because men will together determine their destiny;
because it will be a democratic society.2
07
How seminal these stirrings of humanist socialism in East German
legal doctrine will eventually be depends largely on the outcome of the
current economic reform. If the new tenets of political economy prevail
and prove successful, one can expect law to be further rehabilitated
and divorced from ideology. Whether these tenets will prevail, how-
ever, is another question. The reform's original emphasis on decen-
tralized decision-making seems to have already been watered down by
administrative opposition. 08° If a half-hearted implementation of the
economic reform should lead to failure and from there to what Gross-
man calls the "recentralization process" in a socialist economy,^ new
reliance on administrative over economic controls will undoubtedly
affect not only the importance of law in East Germany but its protec-
tive and (eventually) democratizing functions as well.
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